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CHAPTER IV
PLATO, TEXTUAL AUTHORITY, AND FICTIVE ETHNOGRAPHY
“Plato wants to emit. Seed, artificially, technically.
That devil of a Socrates holds the syringe. To sow the
entire earth, to send the same fertile card to everyone.“^
Do some attempts to avoid Socrates's "syringe" by
ethnographers writing in the 1970's and 1980's succeed?
Have any of these attempts avoided Plato’s "seed?" If so,
the term "postmodern," defined as a renewed interest in
"the form and functions of discourse and rhetoric,"*6 has
become the sign of anthropology’s attempts to move away
from Realist and Interpretive/Translative reliance on
discursive manipulations as the principal means of author¬
ing texts and authorizing positions of textual authority.
The new paths leading from this sign, according to Stephen
Tyler, deny
the discourse of one cultural tradition can
analytically encompass the discourse of another
cultural tradition. [Thus,] postmodern anthro¬
pology refuses both the Hegelian and the scien¬
tific fusion of horizons, which reduces all
traditions to the shape and interests of Western
discourse [by opposing] the semiotic notion that
languages and cultures are just conventional
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systems of signs separate from human use and
■3
intentionality. ...
One possible reason anthropologists have chosen these new
directions is the emphasis on reflexivity, "the capacity
of any system of signification to turn back upon itself,
to make itself its own object by referring to itself,"4
that has dominated the field's notion of itself for the
past decade. By posing questions concerning, for exam¬
ple, variations in ritual, participant emotions, and
political influences that are unanswerable by the texts
developed under Realist or Interpretive/Translative meth¬
odologies, some anthropologists have embarked on a Fou-
caultian journey in which discursive structures are nei¬
ther "sciences nor . . . scientific disciplines, nor . . .
distant prefigurations of the sciences to come, nor . . .
forms that exclude any scientificity from the outset."5
In other words, these explorers of the universe of dis¬
course are beginning to discover that ethnographic texts
do not and cannot characterize ethnological knowledge that
is itself a product of these texts, that ethnographic
texts do not and cannot foretell either their own or their
subjects' futures, and that the inscription of ethnograph¬
ic texts does not and cannot identify discursive elements
which are inherently scientific when compared to other
choices of composing. Ethnographic texts, then, when seen
from this perspective, are "legacies" of the Tower of
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Babel, whose myth, according to Jacques Derrida, tells "of
the need for figuration, for myth, for tropes, [and] for
twists and turns. . . . "6 More importantly, this view of
ethnographic texts denies the assumed relations between
hypotactic discourse's derivational focus and Truth and
paratactic discourse’s focus on the reader's imaginative
participation and fiction, thereby prompting a few anthro¬
pologists such as Stephen Tyler to call for the develop¬
ment of a poetics of anthropology which celebrates the
tropic nature of "reasonable discourse along with the so-
n
called inferential patterns of dialectic and logic."
Kenneth Burke describes a starting point for such a
poetics when he notes in his discussion of Poe's "The
Philosophy of Composition" that
when Poe calls Beauty the 'province' of his poem,
and says that it is best got by a tone of sad¬
ness, or Melancholy, we might say: He is calling
for a kind of attitude or sentiment that will be
the lyric equivalent of the appeal to the pas¬
sions in tragic drama proper. Similarly, insofar
as tragedy excites to pity, and pity eventuates
in tears, we could say that Poe's idea of Beauty
in the lyric hovers about this same motive, as
when he says: 'Beauty of whatever kind, in its
supreme development, invariably excites the
sensitive soul to tears. Melancholy is thus the
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most legitimate of all the poetic tones.'
A new poetics of ethnography, then, would call for dis¬
course that invokes within a reader an "attitude" that
mirrors an ethnography's appeal to, for example, the
"passions" surrounding the audience of a ritual perform¬
ance, the participants in the ritual, and the political
influences influencing all of the above as well as the
reasonable nature of dialectic which "hovers" over the
reader as it moves her from questions to answers, from
initial acceptance to acknowledgment of truth. Such
discourse would, moreover, merge "subjectivity and objec¬
tivity into the undifferentiated cosmic process [wherein]
the 'real* is process, the Heraclitian flux rather than
the timeless structures of Plato.
A growing number of ethnographers have translated
these dictums into texts in which illustrative narration
combines with such "literary" devices as characterization,
point of view, figurative language, and setting, a combi¬
nation which, according to some anthropological critics,
institutes the concept of the ethnographer as simply
another person with a story to tell.10 All anthropolo¬
gists, however, have not recognized this direction of
ethnography as the solution to the problem of domination
in Realist and Interpretive/Translative texts. Instead,
by acknowledging the problems inherent in writing itself
and by implicitly acknowledging Jacques Derrida's
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observation that "... the truth inhabits fiction as the
master of the house, as the law of the house, as the
economy of fiction. The truth executes the economy of
fiction, directs, organizes, and makes possible
fiction . . . ,a number of ethnographers overtly
recognize the link between hypotactic style and scientific
truth, between a theory's explanatory power and reality,
and between Platonic method as revealed in his dialogues
and ethnography. Ethnographers writing what I call
Representative Ethnography, for example, use the cultural
practices they study as the supporting data needed to
advance their own specific agendas. The goal of Represen¬
tative ethnographers, therefore, differs from the Realist
and Interpretive/Translative goals only in that the Repre¬
sentative ethnographers overtly state their objectives.
As a result, Representative ethnography's sense of textual
authority relies once again on an objectifying and thus
dominative rhetoric that either displaces competing per¬
ceptions of a culture or develops a syllogistic examina¬
tion of oppositions which lead to the premises needed to
support the syllogism's conclusion. Moreover, as was true
for Realist and Interpretive/Translative textual authori¬
ty, Representative textual authority increases according
to the success the writer has in establishing a domain
outside of the studied culture, for it is from this
perspective that the ethnographer objectivizes the
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participants in the studied cultural practices, reducing
them to mere data. Finally, Representative textual au¬
thority is reflected by the ability of the ethnographer to
control the direction of the text and thus maintain the
guise of the single guide capable of leading the reader to
the truth. Melford E. Spiro, for instance, states clearly
in the introduction to his Oedipus in the Trobriands that
his goal is to show that Bronislaw Malinowski's argument
that Freud's Oedipus complex may be found only in socie¬
ties based on Western models is "seriously flawed and its
data frustratingly thin."12 By showing the "flaws" in
Malinowski's definition of the Oedipus complex and in his
subsequent method of discovering data and by illustrating
the "thin" nature of this data, Spiro effectively dis¬
places Malinowski's argument as a serious treatment of
Trobriand culture and advances his own Freudian agenda as
it applies to cultural description.
According to Spiro, Malinowski's initial flaw lies in
his "misunderstanding" Freud's concept of the Oedipus
complex. This distortion is seen in Malinowski’s treat¬
ment of the relationships between the Trobriand boy and
his mother and the Trobriand man and his mother. Malinow¬
ski claims that the matrilineal complex in the Trobriands
focuses hostility not on the father but on the mother's
brother, for he, not the father, is the source of all
authority. Further, since the Trobriand boy is weaned
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from the mother between the ages of two and three, he does
not undergo the psychological "wrenching" the forced
separation at an earlier age causes in children in Western
societies. Moreover, Malinowski claims that no examples
exist of the Trobriand man's conscious incestuous feelings
for the mother. Spiro notes, however, that the taboo
concerning mother-son incest indicates the "boy's sexual
attraction to the mother . . . persists into puberty,
rather than being dissipated in early childhood." ^ In
addition, Spiro alludes to Freud's treatment of mother-son
incest, observing that since
mother-son incest is not expected by Oedipal
theory, and since . . . its absence in the
Trobriands is duplicated in normal populations in
the West, the Trobriand finding can hardly be
attributed to the matrilineal 'constitution' of
the Trobriand family, nor can it be taken as
evidence for the absence of an Oedipus complex.1^
In this fashion, Spiro displaces Malinowski's treat¬
ment of Freudian theory's applicability to anthropological
methodology, thereby leaving the Trobriand Islanders open
to domination by Spiro’s application of Oedipal theory.
More important to this study, however, is the building of
Spiro's textual authority as it is revealed in the argu¬
ments outlined above. The dominative rhetoric
characteristic of the Realist and Interpretive/Translative
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ethnographies is repeated here, for it is through this
rhetoric that Malinowski’s perception of Trobriand culture
is depicted as a misrepresentation and thus dismissed.
Moreover, it is through this rhetoric that the Trobriand
Islanders are reduced to mere data useful only in their
support for Spiro’s theory, for as Spiro notes, Trobriand
descriptions of their beliefs and attitudes are important
only in that they provide contexts surrounding the “onto¬
genetic support for our hypothesis that a strong Oedipus
complex . . . exists in the Trobriands."15 As a result,
Spiro's sense of textual authority develops from his
construction of a domain outside of Trobriand culture and
based on Freudian theory from which he can displace Mali¬
nowski's arguments, objectify the Trobriand Islanders, and
control the direction of the text. Spiro, therefore,
maintains his guise of the single authoritive guide capa¬
ble of leading the reader to a dialectical truth.
Derek Freeman's Margaret Mead and Samoa: The Making
and Unmaking of an Anthropological Mvth provides another
example of Representative ethnogaphy's overt reliance on
Platonic method and textual authority. By perceiving
Margaret Mead's work in Samoa as a representation of Franz
Boas's involvement in the early twentieth century debates
on adolescent behavior, which pitted believers in physio¬
logical determinism against believers in cultural
determinism, Freeman creates a starting point for a
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rhetoric of opposition which allows him to develop a
syllogistic examination of Mead's findings. Thus, the
Samoans are objectivized as data supporting the premise
that Mead's findings were determined early on by "the
results of a special inquiry devised by Boas"16 to show
"both eugenics and the racial interpretation of history as
irremediably dangerous."1^ When this premise is combined
with the premise that Franz Boas, out of a need for a
"'scientific and detailed investigation of hereditary and
. 1 Q
environmental conditions'" to support his own belief in
the superiority of cultural determinism, found in Margaret
Mead the "spirited young cultural determinist"^ he needed
to carry out his investigation, the proposition's truth
that Mead's work represents nothing more than a manipulat¬
ed confirmation of Boas's a priori assumptions concerning
adolescent development is dialectically demonstrated.
More important to this investigation is the sense of
textual authority Freeman develops in his treatment of
Mead's Samoan experiment. According to Freeman,
Boas had fully accepted that adolescence, in
Europe and the United States, was a difficult
period. That this was the case in the United
States was also fully recognized by Mead, but,
given the 'determinism of culture' in which she
had been taught to believe, it might be, she
surmised, that in some remote part of the world,
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such as Samoa, things were wholly different. And
from this she derived the supposition that 'if a
society could be found in which the growing boys
and girls missed out on all this storm and
stress, then the anthropologist would know . . .
o n
that his storm and stress was not inevitable.'
It is apparent here that Mead's interests demand the
reduction of the Samoan people to data supporting her
research goal. Freeman echoes Mead's objectivizing rheto¬
ric when he claims that his goal is not the construction
of
an alternative ethnography of Samoa. Rather, the
evidence [he presents] . . . has the specific
purpose of scientifically refuting the proposi¬
tion that Samoa is a negative instance by demon¬
strating that the depictions on which Mead based
this assertion are, in varying degree,
O 1
mistaken. x
Thus, Freeman's textual authority, as does the textual
authority of the Intrepretive/Translative ethnographers,
relies on an objectifying rhetoric whose roots are found
in Plato’s "Phaedo." Moreover, this rhetoric takes the
form of oppositions operating at several levels. At one
level is the political opposition of physiological deter¬
minism and cultural determinism as represented by such
signs as biology's "calm scientific investigation [being]
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directly linked with racist views like those contained in
o o
Madison Grant's The Passing of the Great Race"^ and
anthropology's humanist interests being directly linked
with "a doctrine of absolute cultural determinism that
totally excluded biological variables"^ and such person¬
ages as E. B. Tylor (physiological determinism) and Franz
Boas (cultural determinism). At a second level is the
opposition of the Western societies and "exotic" Samoa as
represented by such signs as Western adolescents' "stormy
and stressful" situations and Samoa's adolescents' sunny
and relaxed situations. Finally, at a third level is the
theoretical opposition of Freeman's "more scientific
anthropological paradigm"24 represented by a Hegelian
synthesis in which genetic and exogenetic parameters form
a theory of human behavior and Mead's paradigm represented
by its conclusion that "culture, or nurture, was the
absolute determinant of the events of adolescence."25
Freeman's textual authority, then, develops from his
syllogistic investigation of these oppositional represen¬
tations which lead to the premises described above, which
create Freeman's domain outside of the Samoan culture,
which guide the direction of the text, and which maintain
his guise as the single guide capable of leading the
reader to a dialectical truth.
It appears, then, that the ethnographers pursuing what
I call Fictive ethnography--that is, ethnographies in which
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dialectical representations of observed cultural practices
rely explicitly on what has been regarded as techniques of
fiction and paratactic styles—exhibit the most signifi¬
cant movement away from the Realist and Inter¬
pretive/Translative reliance on Plato's discursive, dia¬
lectical manipulations as the principal means of authoring
texts and authorizing positions of textual authority. I
have, therefore, chosen Jane Kramer's The Last Cowboy and
John McPhee's Basin and Range--two examples of Fictive
ethnography which John Van Maanen notes are good represen¬
tatives of the "literary tales" that mark the creative
phase currently motivating "presentation[s] of social
reality"—as the initial model and copy for my analyses
of ethnographies in the Fictive genre. In addition, I
include Michael Kunze's Highroad to the Stake: A Tale of
Witchcraft--a third representative of the genre that,
although published too late for Van Maanen to include in
his text, has been used in anthropology courses—to see if
this reliance on Platonic method has been avoided. In
addition, I have chosen Plato's "Timaeus" as the Platonic
dialogue from which to begin this investigation, for
within this dialogue, Plato specifically makes use of his
dialectic combined with "poetic" language.
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Section I
". . . the will to exercise dominant control in society
and history has . . . discovered a way to clothe, dis¬
guise, rarify, and wrap itself systematically in the
language of truth, discipline, rationality, utilitarian
value, and knowledge. And this language, in its natural¬
ness, authority, professionalism, assertiveness, and
antitheoretical directness, is . . . [dialectical] dis¬
course. " 27
In his attempt to "sow the entire earth," Plato provides
in the "Timaeus" a "postcard" on which is written a dia¬
lectical description of the creation of the world that is
once again based on a syllogistic exploration of opposi¬
tions. The soul, as it was in the "Phaedo," is opposed to
the body as a metaphor for Plato's distinction between
knowledge (represented by the Forms that were initially
developed in the "Phaedo") and belief (represented by
sensible objects). Moreover, as it was in the "Phaedo,"
knowledge is characterized by its imperviousness to time
and argument, while belief is characterized by its reli¬
ance on ever-changing tangibles. The creation of the
world thus becomes for Plato a frame within which he may
treat his actual concern: developing a methodology for
dealing with oppositions that focuses on apprehending
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knowledge through collecting examples and dividing them
according to specified characteristics. Further, as he
did in the "Phaedo," Plato directs not only the character
of Socrates but also the characters of Timaeus and Cri-
tias, thus providing the reader with a portrait of a
displaced Plato who, once again, is unable to attend this
social gathering because "he has been taken ill."28 This
portrait, as it was in the previously discussed dialogues,
is imperative to Plato's sense of textual authority; by
hiding himself behind the discursive weaving that is the
dialogue, Plato takes for himself the voices of Socrates,
Timaeus, and Critias. Because they are thus unable to
respond, the dialogue becomes a monologue, and Plato's is
the voice (pen) of authority.
Seen from this perspective, the structure of the
"dialogue" consists of an introduction, which strengthens
Plato’s authority by labeling counterarguments as products
of the Sophists and by characterizing Plato's own proposi¬
tions as stemming from authoritative sources, and two
narratives, each having a different though related sub¬
ject. According to Plato’s Socrates, the context for the
"dialogue" as it is described in the introductory passages
is civil strife: "There are conflicts which all cities
undergo, and I should like to hear someone tell of our own
city carrying on a struggle against her neigh-
O Q
bors. . . . Thus, the authoritative positions' voices
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are those of the holders of high office. Plato's Timaeus
is "in wealth and rank the equal of any of his fellow
citizens; he has held the most important and honorable
offices in his own state, and . . . has scaled the heights
on
of all philosophyJ Plato's Critias is "no novice in
O 1
the matters of which we are speaking,"and Plato's
Socrates is, of course, the most powerful voice in the
Greek civilization. The voices opposing these authorities
are those who
have plenty of brave words and conceits,
but . . . being only wanderers from one city to
another, and having never had habitations of
their own, they may fail in their conception of
philosophers and statesmen and may not know what
they do and say in time of war, when they are
fighting or holding parley with their enemies. ^
These are the Sophists, and by labeling their arguments as
"sophistry," Plato effectively silences them. What the
reader is left with, then, is the monologic authority of
Plato, whose subsequent two narratives create the history
of the world.
The first of these narratives is Plato's Critias's
tale concerning Solon's voyage to Egypt and his discovery
of the city and district of Sais, whose inhabitants "are
great lovers of the Athenians and say that they are in
some way related to them."33 Solon, while meeting with
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one of the city's elder priests, tells the priest about
the ancient history of Athens, to which the priest re¬
sponds, "you [Hellenes] are all young; there is no old
opinion handed down among you by ancient tradition, nor
any science which is hoary with age."34 The reason for
this lack of belief and knowledge is the cycles of de¬
struction, caused by deluges or fires, which periodically
devastate civilization. More importantly, Plato uses this
loss to distinguish the opposition between the philoso¬
pher's soul that is capable of historicizing knowledge
through recalling what it knew prior to its present life
and the believer's soul that is capable of understanding
only that which is sensible and thus arguable. In addi¬
tion, the loss of knowledge distinguishes the opposition
between the state of grace that surrounded the past's
philosophers and the present state of damnation in which
believers dangerously outnumber philosophers and thus
threaten the very attainability of knowledge. Thus, the
priest tells Solon,
just when you and other nations are beginning to
be provided with letters and the other requisites
of civilized life, after the usual interval, the
stream from heaven, like a pestilence, comes
pouring down and leaves only those of you who are
destitute of letters and education, and so you
have to begin all over again like children, and
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know nothing of what happened in ancient
tiroes. . . . J
The priest continues with his story, telling Solon of the
war between Athens and Atlantis, a conflict won by Athens
and marked by a series of violent earthquakes and floods
which resulted in Atlantis’s sinking into the ocean.
The importance of Plato's Critias's tale to both the
remaining narrative concerning the creation of the world
and to Plato's textual authority lies in its development
of the motifs of cyles and the importance of writing and
in its description of the position of importance Athens
holds in civilization. The motif of cycles ties the first
narrative to the second, for the cycles play a large part
in Plato’s Timaeus's description of the creation of the
soul and body of the universe. The motif of the impor¬
tance of writing allows Plato to return to a device used
in the "Meno" and the "Phaedo"; by playing what Jasper
Neel calls "the role of recording secretary" for the
characters in the dialogue, Plato reinforces his textual
authority. Disputing Critias, whose tale is a repetition
of the one Solon told to Critias's great-grandfather, who
in turn told it to Critias's grandfather, who passed it on
to Critias, is difficult since Critias is the sole surviv¬
ing member of the family and since, at the time of the
dialogue's writing, Critias, as well as Solon, is dead. A
similar situation holds for Socrates. When Plato wrote
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the dialogue, Socrates had been dead for some time. Thus,
as he did in the "Meno" and the "Phaedo," Plato uses
writing, the only means by which he may manipulate time
and sequence, to textualize his sense of authority. More¬
over, as the only living heir to the Athenian position of,
according to the Egyptian priest, conqueror of imperialist
Atlantis and thus of liberator of the world, Plato is the
sole guide capable of recalling this heritage and making
use of its knowledge.
Plato’s Critias’s tale of "not only the general heads,
but the particulars, as they were told to [him]," howev¬
er, must wait for another time. His story of man's devel¬
opment must follow Plato's Timaeus's tale of the "genera-
O Q
tion of the world and . . . the creation of man."J The
cycle motif is thus enlarged to a textual structure,
thereby making coherent the two narratives.
Plato’s Timaeus’s narrative begins with a revocation
of the opposition between the philosopher and the simple
believer:
we must make a distinction and ask, What is that
which always is and has no becoming [Being], and
what is that which is always [B]ecoming and never
is? That which is apprehended by intelligence
and reason is always in the same state, but that
which is conceived by opinion with the help of
sensation and without reason is always in a
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process of becoming and perishing and never
really is.^9
Re-emphasizing the opposition between knowledge and belief
creates yet another aspect of coherence between the first
and second narratives. More importantly, it reifies the
Platonic method of representing oppositions, in this case
through a rhetoric of cycles, as a means of dialectically
developing premises needed to support a proposition. In
other words, "Being" and "Becoming" represent two opposing
realms. The former includes the eternal and the unchang¬
ing which are made understandable through Plato's dialec¬
tical reasoning, while the latter includes the mortal and
the inconsistent which are made understandable through
belief and argument. In addition, "Being" and "Becoming"
are the dividing concepts Plato attaches to philosophers
and sophists, an opposition represented by a cycle of
creation:
was the world . . . always in existence and
without beginning, or created, and had it a
beginning? Created . . . visible and tangible
and having a body, and therefore sensible, and
all sensible things are apprehended by opinion
and sense, and are in a process of creation and
created.
The result of this opposition strengthens Plato's So¬
crates's initial description of Plato’s Timaeus as having
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"scaled the heights of all philosophy,"41 for as the phi¬
losopher only he can deal with Being. Moreover, the
opposition further displaces a sophistic counterargument;
since the sophist can deal only with the Becoming, the
arguments concerned with Being are reserved for the phi¬
losopher. Finally, when the reader remembers that Timaeus
is Plato’s Timaeus, Plato’s self-portrayal as the single
guide capable of leading the reader to truth becomes
clearer; Plato the writer knows what is to come, for he is
the historicizer, the controller, the wielder of the
signifying finger.
Despite its attachment to belief and argument, Plato's
Timaeus describes the "Becoming" world as "good," for the
creator, being free from jealousy, "desired that all
things should be as like himself as they could be."4^
More specifically, since those things that are "Becoming"
reflect the eternal and unchanging aspects of the reasona¬
ble creator, this realm reflects the orderliness of God.
Plato’s Timaeus thus states that when God found his crea¬
tion to be disorderly, he "brought order, considering that
his was in every way better than the other."43 It is this
orderliness which makes important the reminder that this
depiction of the creation of the world is based on the
"testimony of wise men"44 and the observation that the
creation of the world described here illuminates the soul-
body hierarchy underlying the creation. Couched in a
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metaphor of the human artist, God, "when he was framing
the universe . . . put intelligence in soul, and soul in
body, that he might be the creator of a work which was by
nature fairest and best."45 The unspecified "wise men"
highlight Plato's method of creating history, and by
grounding his soul-body hierarchy in the wise men's
"testimony," Plato textually validates his authority.
Moreover, by hierarchically opposing the soul and the
body, Plato's Timaeus can use the world (body) as a visi¬
ble image of the creator (soul), a metaphorical link
extended by his viewing the world as an organic product of
creation: "we may say that the world came into being—a
living creature truly endowed with soul and intelligence
by the providence of God."46 Thus, the basis for a prem¬
ise stating the philosopher's duty is to discover eternal,
unchanging Truth and supporting Plato's Timaeus's proposi¬
tion that a methodology based on collecting and opposing
in order to define and classify is dialectically true is
discovered through syllogistically examining the opposi¬
tion implied in the cyclical rhetoric on the world's
creation. This basis is further developed in Plato's
Timaeus's discussion of models and copies:
Are we right in saying that there is one world,
or that they are many and infinite? There must
be one only if the created copy is to accord with
the original. For that which includes all other
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intelligible creatures cannot have a second or
companion; in that case there would be need of
another living being which would include both,
and of which they would be parts, and the like¬
ness would be more truly said to resemble not
them, but that other which included them.47
More specifically, the metaphorical link between a model
and its copy reveals the relationship between the world
(body) and the creator (soul). The soul exists in the
body, just as the spirit of the model exists in the copy.
As a result, an interpretation of the orderliness of the
body or copy in terms of the orderliness of the soul or
model is necessarily true. The premise thus develops that
the philosopher in search of knowledge must regard the
soul as the source of knowledge. Plato's Timaeus, there¬
fore, can conclude that since the world is a sensible
reflection of that soul, the philosopher must make use of
a method which defines and classifies the visible aspects
of the world in terms of the eternal, unchanging, orderly
soul to apprehend knowledge. This conclusion is empowered
through its actualization in Plato's Tiamaeus's distinc¬
tion between the philosopher and the simple believer:
The sight ... is the source of the greatest
benefit to [philosophers], for had we never seen
the stars and the sun and the heaven, none of the
words which we have spoken about the universe
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would ever have been uttered. But now the sight
of day and night, and the months and the
revolutions of the years have created . . . the
power of inquiring about the nature of the uni¬
verse. And from this source we have derived
philosophy. . . . God invented and gave us sight
to the end that we might behold the courses of
intelligence in the heaven, and apply them to the
courses of our own intelligence . . . [so that we
might] imitate the absolutely unerring courses of
A Q
God and regulate our own vagaries. °
It is, in addition, obvious that since Plato's voice is
the sole representer of philosophy, it is his voice and
method that are authoritative.
Plato's Timaeus's reliance on metaphor throughout this
syllogistic investigation indicates an importance beyond
that of coherence, for he notes that when the creator was
finished with the world, he resolved to "make the copy
still more like the original"*^ by creating an "image of
eternity . . . moving according to number . . . [that] we
call time."50 Truth, nonetheless, exists outside of time,
for it is Being rather than Becoming. Thus, "'is' alone
is properly attributed to [Being], and 'was' and 'will be'
are only to be spoken of [B]ecoming."5* These terms,
however, are "inaccurate modes of expression,"5^ and since
time is used as an "image of eternity," or Truth, only
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metaphorical language, the language of images, can accu¬
rately express Being.
Such a use of metaphor allows Plato to accomplish
several objectives. First, it permits Plato to represent
his written monologue as dialectical thought. Second, the
use of metaphor offers Plato another means of controlling
the direction of his text. As Jacgues Derrida notes,
metaphor "orients research and fixes results."53 Third,
Kenneth Burke's discussion of terministic screens includes
his observation that "within a field there can be differ¬
ent screens, each with its ways of directing the attention
and shaping the range of observations implicit in the
given terminology,"54 an allusion to the fact that a
metaphor can only be countered by another metaphor. Yet,
since Plato has labeled all other metaphors as sophistry,
his metaphors retain their authoritative stance, despite
their attachment to the sensible world of belief and
argumentation. Having been met, these objectives allow
Plato to secure his position as the wielder of the en-
scribing finger, for as the singular master of both dia¬
lectic and metaphorical language, only he can guide the
reader to truth through method and images.
Using this initial analysis of the "Timaeus" as a
starting point for examining the Platonic dialogue's
continued influence on Fictive ethnography's textual
authority allows two hypotheses to develop. If this
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genre's texts reveal the same ideological and hegemonic
characteristics identified in the "Timaeus," Jacques
Derrida’s portrait of Plato's relationship with Socrates
will continue to metaphorically represent the relationship
between Plato and the ethnographer and between the ethnog¬
rapher and his or her object of study. Moreover, if the
relationship between Plato and the ethnographer is main¬
tained, the relationship between the monological dialogue
and the ethnographic text will be maintained; the "copy"
will reproduce the soul of the "model." An analysis of
the texts typifying the Fictive genre as identified and
defined earlier will indicate the accuracy of these hy¬
potheses .
Section II
"I listened at the time with childlike interest to the old
man's narrative; he was very ready to teach me, and I
asked him again and again to repeat his words, so that,
like an indelible picture, they were branded into my
mind.1,55
Much as Plato uses Critias's tale of the ancient Hellenes
to historicize his depiction of the creation of the world,
Jane Kramer uses the myth of the American Old West to
historicize her depiction of the world of the contemporary
cowboy, the focus of her study, The Last Cowboy. Further,
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like Plato's Critias, who listens to his "informant's"
words until "they [are] branded into [his] mind," Kramer
listens to her informant, Henry Blanton, "branding" his
words into the "stack of notebooks, getting bigger every
day, on the bench by the kitchen door at the Willow Ranch
headquarters."55 The similarities between the two texts
continue. Solon, during a journey to mysterious Egypt in
search of information concerning "antiquity,"57 discovers
an elder priest who proceeds to tell him a portion of the
lost history of the Hellenes. Similarly, Kramer, during a
journey to the mysterious Texas Panhandle (mysterious in
that its symbols, the "calf cradle, fence-mending tools,
mesquite trees and cactus flowers . . . [and the correct]
boots,"5® like Egypt's pyramids and temples, represent to
Kramer a locale as exotic as Egypt is to Plato), in search
of information concerning "the most 'American' thing [she]
could think of,"59 discovers Henry Blanton, who proceeds
to tell her about a cowboy’s life. In addition, Solon
approaches the priest with an attitude configured by myths
concerning the glorious history of the Hellenes, a history
represented by larger-than-life figures: "[Solon] began to
tell about . . . Phoroneus, who is called 'the first man,’
and about Niobe, and after the Deluge, of the survival of
Deucalion and Pyrrha, and he traced the genealogy of their
descendents. . . . Similarly, Kramer approaches
Henry Blanton with an attitude configured by a myth
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concerning the glorious life of the cowboy, a life repre¬
sented by an association of cowboys with "high adventure
and the promise and challenge and freedom of a
continentBut by far the most important similarity
between Kramer and Plato is Kramer's reliance on Plato's
dialectical method of using a syllogistic investigation of
oppositions, which leads to premises needed to support a
proposition. While the propositions themselves are dif¬
ferent, the ultimate goals are the same. Plato uses
Solon's tale to support a depiction of a fallen society
(in the words of the Egyptian priest, a "young" society)^
whose decline represents the opposition between the phi¬
losopher's perception of the soul and the believer's
perception of sensibles, while Kramer historicizes Henry
Blanton's tale to support a depiction of a myth-controlled
cowboy culture. Blanton's words focus on a life that can
be settled into yet not settled for, a life of "deep,
prideful disappointment"^ spent searching for a mythical
restoration yet dominated by "the memory of his father's
and grandfather's cowboy lives. *'6^ He therefore is placed
in the position of Plato's believers and thus becomes
representative of the opposition between the philosopher’s
(ethnographer's) perception of the soul (myth) and the
believer’s (informant's) perception of sensibles. Such a
method of arriving at a mythical image through a dialecti¬
cal movement beyond sensibles to the realm of theory,
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according to Kenneth Burke, reveals the method's ideologi¬
cal basis; the rhetoric of transcendence which marks
Plato's and Kramer's method is "necessarily partial [in
that] whatever its claims to universal validity, its
'principles’ favor the interests of some group more than
others.In Kramer's case, the "favored group" is
Kramer's acquired Platonic role of recording secretary for
her characters so that she may uncover myth. As a result,
Henry Blanton’s ability to dispute Kramer's observations
is difficult, for his voice is hegemonized by Kramer's,
leaving Kramer's as the voice (pen) of authority. Thus,
Kramer, like Plato, uses writing to textualize her author¬
ity. Moreover, as the only "philosopher" in a textual
world inhabited by believers, Kramer is the sole guide
capable of dialectically leading the reader to the truth
inherent in her mythic image of the contemporary American
cowboy. Initially, then, the two hypotheses described
above appear to be born out. The first portion of Kram¬
er's text reveals the same dominative characteristics
identified in Plato's "Timaeus." Derrida's portrait of
Plato's relationship with Socrates thus metamorphizes,
allowing Socrates's features to take on those of Kramer.
Further evolution of Derrida's portrait, following the
above investigation of Kramer's text, shows Plato's face
changing to Kramer's, while Socrates's persona dons a
cowboy hat, boots, and work clothes. In light of this
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apparent confirmation of the first hypothesis, the first
portion of Kramer’s text appears to similarly validate the
second hypothesis. The monologic ethnography which is the
product of the dialogues recorded in Kramer's "stack of
notebooks" reproduces the soul of the Platonic model of
textual authority. An examination of the rest of Kramer's
text will indicate the continued strength of the hypothe¬
ses .
Kramer uses the Platonic combination of figurative
language and dialectic to invoke Plato's notion of time as
an image of Truth and to weld that sense of Truth with her
proposition that a myth's domination of a culture results
in its members feeling the contradictory emotions of
inadequacy and fear and affirmation and hope and thus
seeing their lives as being both futile and proud. The
resulting rhetoric of opposition creates a world whose
twentieth-century inhabitants have fallen from the grace
represented by the myth of the ninteenth-century Old West
to a state marked by "treachery and promise":
Henry Blanton turned forty on an April day when
the first warm winds of spring crossed the Texas
Panhandle and the diamondback rattlers, fresh and
venomous from their winter sleep, came slipping
out from under the cap rock of the Canadian River
breaks. It was . . . the kind of day that Henry
would have expected for the showdown in a good
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Western. Henry was particular about
Westerns. . . . [For when he was a boy] Henry
braved the moaning ghosts who rode the river
breeze past the old stone line camp where he
slept alone ... by fixing his thoughts on calm,
courageous movie cowboys [such as] John Wayne,
Gary Cooper, and Glenn Ford.66
Kramer's Blanton, however, is not "particular" about his
father, who "once had been as fine a cowboy as any man in
the Panhandle," or his grandfather, who "had made the long
cattle drive to Wyoming . . . when Indians were still
marauding and a rustler . . . would as often as not shoot
a trail boss . . . looking for his strays."67 In other
words, Henry Blanton is a member of a culture whose domi¬
nant myth both motivates and frustrates the lives of its
members. Thus, the "first warm winds of spring" hold the
potential opportunity of becoming the "calm, courageous"
mythical hero represented by "John Wayne, Gary Cooper, and
Glenn Ford," but also hold the potential opportunity of
meeting the "venomous rattlers" represented by Blanton's
father and grandfather. Yet, since Blanton exists in a
fallen state, a position marked by his loss of "'expre-
ssin' right'", the mythic quality which includes "the kind
of quiet certainty that sustained a man when times were
bad,"66 the greater probability lies in meeting with the
diamondbacks.
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The similarity between Kramer's opening paragraphs and
the beginnings of Plato's Critias's and Plato's Timaeus's
narratives emphasizes the relationship Plato describes
between the model and the copy; one shares the soul of the
other. More specifically, Kramer’s beginning description
of Henry Blanton evokes Plato's Critias's opposition
between grace and damnation, between knowledge and belief,
between the philosopher and the believer. Once again, the
image of a world that has fallen into nothing but belief
due to the inhabitants' loss of both knowledge and the
appropriate means of rediscovering that knowledge domi¬
nates Kramer's depiction of Blanton. In addition, Kram¬
er 's beginning creates an opposition between the ethnogra¬
pher and her informant which mirrors Plato's oppositions.
The inscripting ethnographer can historicize the inform¬
ant's words through a created context inaccessible to the
informant's perceptions of the sensibles which make up his
world just as Plato's Critias can historicize knowledge
unattainable to his ancestors or Solon.
Kramer continues her description of Blanton the be¬
liever by focusing his means of measuring himself against
others on sensibles. He is "the foreman of ninety thou¬
sand acres . . . [and is] a good rider and a fine
roper."69 Moreover, he can
pull a calf with considerable skill, and when he
ha[s] to he [can] cut a dogie from the belly of
278
its dying mother. He [can] account for every one
of the twenty-two hundred cows in his
charge . . . and [knows] which cows [deliver]
strong, healthy calves each spring, which cows
[need] help calving, [and] which ones [tend] to
miss a year or deliver stillborn. He
[knows] . . . when a fence [is] down or [when] a
pole [is rotten]. He [can] put his ear to the
pump pipe of a windmill well that [is] drawing
poorly and tell in minutes whether the checks
[are] broken or the water, three hundred and
7 0
fifty feet underground, [is] drying up.
Nevertheless, because his measure is based on these sensi-
bles, Blanton is not "the sort of cowboy who inspire[s]
admiration or respect.",A The symbols on which he places
so much meaning are representations of "Becoming," the
realm of faulty information Plato's Timaeus associates
with the mortal and the inconsistent. Blanton, therefore,
remains trapped in a snare of ignorance; not only has he,
like most of the Hellenes, lost both the means of attain¬
ing knowledge and the understanding of what knowledge is,
he also "does not know why and [is] ashamed of himself
7 7
anyway for wondering."
This feeling of entrapment manifests itself in Blan¬
ton's restlessness and lack of control. He cannot "manage
that economy of gesture and person which [is] appropriate
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in a cowboy, he drinks too much during the brief periods
of time he spends in town, and while working he keeps "a
bottle of bourbon in his Ford pickup truck and another in
his saddlebag."74 Further, the younger Blanton's pen¬
chant for practical jokes has turned into the older Blan¬
ton's "ugly and immodest" attitude toward his wife Betsy,
his daughter Melinda, and the cows and horses under his
care.75 Blanton prides himself, most frequently in dia¬
tribes aimed at Betsy or Melinda's requests for money, on
having left behind the camps "where Betsy had to cart
water from a spring to do the dishes or wash her babies'
diapers . . . [and where] even the best cowboy was worth
no more to his boss than a hundred and fifty dollars a
month in wages, a shack for a home, and the meat from
7 fi
steers that were too scrawny to send to auction."
Since he became foreman, his family now lives in a "pre¬
fabricated house with electricity and a telephone and
running water--a house with a highway only twelve miles
away down a negotiable dirt road." ' And, Kramer reports
that Blanton's neighbors believe that Blanton "move[s] his
cows a little too fast for their placidity, [drives] his
yearlings a little too fast for their daily gain . . .
forgetfs] to keep his knife sharpened [while working
cattle] . . . [and when] dehorning, he saw[s] too deep
into a calf’s horns, [turning] the creature's lowing . . .
mad with pain."7®
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Kramer's portrayal of Henry Blanton concludes with a
return to the source of his beliefs about what a cowboy
should be. Kramer states that western movies show Blanton
that Ma good cowboy [is] a hero . . . [who] live[s] by
codes, not rules—codes of calm, solitude, and honor.
Moreover, these movies imply that “a cowboy ha[s] a spe¬
cial arrangement with nature" that allows him to know "a
truth and a freedom and a satisfaction that ordinary men
on
did not." When Blanton examines his life according to
these "codes" and the "truth, freedom, and satisfaction"
which derive from them, however, he finds himself watching
a cycle of change from a static position. His situation
thus illustrates the growing chasm that separates him and
his ideal and which separates "Being" and "Becoming," the
philosopher and the believer, the soul and the body, and
the ethnographer and her informant. The circuit preacher,
who affirms Blanton's belief that "a man on a horse surely
ha[s] a head start in the business of grace over Commu¬
nists and New Yorkers," visits less frequently because he
is now making money by "giving I.Q. tests to the Baptists
on his route for a rich Bible college that was running a
study called God and Intellect.The ranch owner has
moved to London, and his orders to Blanton come through "a
college-boy ranch manager who [knows] more about juggling
account books than raising cattle and [who, because he is
afraid of the cattle, does] most of his managing from the
281
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driver's seat of a locked, air-conditioned Buick."0^
Powerless believer that he is, Henry Blanton cannot
participate in the cycle. He therefore condemns the
changes as the results of "malice and greed . . . [and]
despair,"®® the characteristics of codes antithetical to
those of the cowboy. Even so, Kramer notes that Blanton
bleakly observes that he has nothing more to show for his
O A
life than "a hand-tooled saddle and a few horses." His
birthday cake has lost its meaning because Betsy is not
speaking to him, Melinda has used all the hot water in her
preparations for school, he is hungover, and his West is
"full of fences and feedyards," is populated by college-
educated "calf traders and futures brokers," and is domi¬
nated by "ranchers who [commute] from London or the South
O C
of France."03 More importantly, the oppositions repre¬
sented by Blanton's situation, when examined syllogisti-
cally, form premises which support Kramer's proposition
concerning the effects of a dominant myth on a culture.
Henry Blanton, the cowboy culture's representative, be¬
lieves deeply in a myth of the Old West and feels the
contradictory emotions of inadequacy and fear and affirma¬
tion and hope. He sees his life as being both futile and
proud. Moreover, Blanton sees his life as static; there
is "not much chance [given the above situation] for a hero
on a horse."®® In addition, when the reader remembers
that this Blanton, like Timaeus, is the product of his
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controlling author, Kramer's portrayal of her role as
Blanton's recording secretary becomes the portrait of the
single guide capable of leading the reader to truth.
Kramer, the writer of ethnography, knows what is to come,
for she is the controller, the wielder of the signifying
finger. Her job, however, is not finished, for like Plato
she must support her position of authority. Kramer thus
grounds her Old West myth in a narrative of the nine¬
teenth-century West, much as Plato's Timaeus grounds his
narrative on the creation of the world in the testimony of
wise elders and in Plato's Critias's tale.
By interspersing illustrative narratives between
segments whose flavor reflects James Kinneavy's definition
of literary discourse, Kramer creates an application of
Stephen Tyler's combination of tropeical discourse and
dialectic, thus bringing her text into acceptable (by
some) ethnographic form. But more importantly, Kramer's
insertion of illustrative narrative allows for the histor-
icization she needs to maintain the power of her domina-
tive myth. Just as Plato's Timaeus refers to "wise men"
to ground his explanation of the creation of the world,
Kramer predicates her myth of the Old West on the writings
of Owen Wister and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Thus the nine¬
teenth-century cowboy becomes the spirit of the "Virgin¬
ian, riding west ... to shoot straight, with a noble and
virtuous heart, and kill his villain,"87 melded with
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Emile's character of the natural man, who is "set . . .
against outlaws and spoilers, card sharks and Comanches"
and who, when measured against the Easterners, "[shows]
them up, with his solemn, masculine behavior, as weak men
Q O
and petty moralists."00 And, Kramer notes, these images
were psychologically necessary to "a people determined to
pg
expand across the continent and profit from it,"o:7 for
they helped develop in these people the mental framework
necessary for their quick domination of a land inhabited
by competitors. But the images do not include the "real"
cowboys of the nineteenth century, the
range bums and drifters and failed outlaws, freed
slaves and impoverished half-breeds, ruined
framers from the Reconstruction South and the
tough, wild boys from all over who were the
frontier's dropouts, boys who had no appetite for
the ties of land or family, who could make a
four-month cattle drive across a thousand miles
Q 0
and not be missed by anyone.
What the myth does for these individuals, according to
Kramer, is take "the edge off their frightful lawlessness
and [make] a virtue of their old failures."91 Thus, Henry
Blanton's grandfather, the man who "lost [his] five slaves
to the Thirteenth Amendment and [his] Georgia hog farm to
carpetbaggers,"moved west to partake in his portion of
the myth by becoming one of the "tough, wild boys from all
284
over." Grandfather Blanton, however, was one of the major¬
ity of people whose lives did not match the myth; he was
simply one of the cowboys who "could run a few steers on
[his] rancher[*s] land along with the ranch cattle, put
the profit from those steers toward a couple of section,
Q ^
and talk about becoming [a rancher himself]."
The grandfather thus becomes a symbol with multiple
meanings for both Henry Blanton and Kramer's reader. To
Blanton, the grandfather represents both the success and
the failure of the cowboy myth, for although he was part
of the key mytheraes of the cowboy myth—he lost everything
to post-Civil War Reconstruction, made the long trip from
Georgia to Texas, and was a participant in the trail
drive—he did not achieve the status of Wister's Virgin¬
ian. Instead, he ended his life with not much more to
show for his life than Henry has. Henry's contradictory
emotions of inadequacy and fear and affirmation and hope
stem from this image of success and failure. To Kramer's
reader, the grandfather represents the success of Kramer's
historicizing process. Through her use of him as an
illustration bridging the myth of the cowboy as written by
Wister and Rousseau and her own history of the
nineteenth-century West, he becomes a visible reflection
of her dialectic. In addition, by using the grandfather
as an image of the distinction between Kramer's knowledge
and Blanton's belief, the reader can see Kramer's
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hierarchical opposition which allows her proposition that
a myth's domination of a culture results in contradictory
emotions to control the depiction of Henry Blanton and
which echoes Plato's Timaeus's description of the domi¬
nance of the soul over the body: God "made the soul in
origin and excellence prior to and older than the body, to
be the ruler and mistress, of whom the body was to be the
subject.The grandfather is as much a creation of
Kramer's as Henry Blanton is. Thus, as the only person in
the text capable of assuming the role of creator, Kramer
is the only soul capable of "ruling" the body of Henry
Blanton. Kramer’s hierarchical ordering of Blanton and
his grandfather, therefore, textualizes her authority.
The remainder of Kramer's text reinforces her dialec¬
tical drawing of Henry Blanton as a historicized represen¬
tative of a culture dominated by a myth. In the spirit of
the Virginian, he carries a Winchester, racked prominently
in his pickup’s rear window, believing that "hiding weap¬
ons was low and cowardly [and] that a man’s right to arm
himself against villainy was something sacred. . . . "^
As a means of maintaining his "special arrangement with
nature" and his belief in the cowboy myth, Blanton adds
sixty feet to his sheet-metal barn while still maintaining
his view from the house's courtyard of the
little hill with its grove of hackberries and
cottonwoods . . . the solitary willow by the
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well . . . the pasture where his horses
graze . . . the wooden pens . . . where the milk
cows and the dogies fed from troughs . . . [and]
the old chuck wagon that [Grandfather] Blanton
once used on roundups.**6
Kramer emphasizes the symbolic power of the old wagon
for both Blanton's myth-controlled existence and her own
proposition concerning cultures dominated by myths by
noting that although Betsy enjoys the evening view of the
ranch's land from a perch on one of the cattle pens, she
cannot get Henry to join her; instead, he spends his
evenings sitting in "the driver's seat of his Granddaddy
Abel's chuck wagon, which he kept parked under the willow
O n
tree."* Kramer extends her emphasis on this symbolic
value to Blanton in her description of Blanton's reason
for reclaiming the wagon from the ranch for which his
grandfather worked when the ranch was sold and in Blan¬
ton's subsequent use of the wagon. After being stopped by
a state trooper for driving with a bottle of bourbon in
his hand, Kramer explains that Blanton's excuse was that
"he was hauling his granddaddy's chuck wagon home to the
family ... so that no son-of-a-bitch corporation college
boys would ever get the opportunity to pretty it up like a
dude-ranch buggy.Moreover, after he repairs the
wagon, Kramer states that Blanton insists on using it
during roundups, demanding that "his hands and all the
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neighbors who would be helping . . . sleep [on the ground
around the wagon] under the stars, the way cowboys used to
Q Q
do. . . . Finally, Kramer extends the wagon's symbolic
value to her proposition by noting that when Blanton,
while hauling the wagon back to his ranch, was stopped by
the state trooper who wanted Blanton to accompany him to
town for a breath analysis, Blanton's bourbon-tinged
explanation was accepted "repentedly" by the trooper. As
another member of the myth-dominated culture, the trooper
understands Blanton's motivation. For as representatives
of the mythical animosity between lawmen and cowboys, they
share the burden placed on them by the Old West myth.
Thus, the trooper and Blanton can sit together "in the
Ford pickup on the hot, dusty day . . . Henry brought his
grandfather's chuck wagon home, [sharing] a momentary
truce [and] mourning the West that was supposed to be."-*-00
In addition to the wagon, Kramer describes Henry
Blanton's clothing as tying him to his domineering myth.
Dressed in black boots, jeans, hat and jacket, a style
described to Blanton as favored by the Virginian and which
Blanton saw worn by Gary Cooper in "High Noon" and thus
chosen as Blanton's working uniform, he hurries through
breakfast "so that he [can] greet his men with the day's
orders looking relaxed and confident."*01 And, just as
she earlier showed the chuck wagon's symbolic value by
placing it as the focal point at which the opposed rules
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of the highway and the cowboy code conflict, Kramer shows
Blanton's clothing's symbolic value by using his clothes
as the point at which the opposed rules created by econom¬
ic necessity and the cowboy’s codes conflict. Because the
ranch takes care of "everything [the Blantons need] except
a decent income" and because ranch owners assume that
"cowboys take better care of their own property than
somebody else's,"1^ the costs of Henry's clothing, along
with ranch gear, groceries, and the general needs of the
Blanton family, far exceed Henry's monthly paycheck.
Thus, Betsy takes a job as an invoice clerk in a grain
dealer's warehouse. The image of the working wife, howev¬
er, violates the cowboy code represented by Henry's cloth¬
ing, and the anger that derives from the code's
desecration drives Henry to confront the man who offered
Betsy the job. Kramer describes Henry's dramatic scene as
an "eloquent" defense of the code. The cowboy's wife has
a
duty to her husband and to the ranch that [pays]
him. [Further,] a foreman's house [is] a kind of
command post, and a foreman's wife [is] . . . the
general's secretary whose job it [is] to stay at
that post taking messages, relaying messages,
keeping track of everybody on the ranch, sending
help in an emergency.1®3
Unlike the trooper, the grain dealer is not a member of
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the cowboy culture. He is a businessman, a participant in
another myth. He is, therefore, adamant about Betsy's
employment. She is, after all, "a respectable woman—not
like one of those town women, with their false eyelashes
and skimpy skirts.-104 Thus, the cycle of change that
finds its expression in economic images and that began
with the ranch owner's move to London opposes Henry Blan¬
ton's static myth once again. This time, however, the
myth loses; Betsy keeps her job, and her employer allows
her to stay home on the days Henry works cattle. Nonethe¬
less, the myth demands a price be exacted for this loss, a
remuneration seen in the decline of Henry's and Betsy's
relationship. The "prettiest girl in her class at the
district high school" takes on a stressed "tightness" that
causes her face to harden "under the bright, careful pouf
of hair that her hairdresser said was just the thing for
softening the features of tall, thin women. Henry,
dressed in black and following an evening meal eaten too
quickly, either retreats "to the parlor with a copy of TV
Guide, looking for a Western to watch on television"
or, in the company of his brother, Tom, makes his way to a
bar in town. On the days the cowboy myth's dominance over
Henry is particularly strong, a day like his fortieth
birthday, trouble ensues. On this occasion, a fight
between Henry and Tom and "two long-haired strangers
dressed in boots and hats and flashy Western suits"107
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results in Henry's receiving bruises and a swollen eye and
in Tom’s being stabbed by a knife and cut by broken glass
from the glass door through which he fell. Thus appeased,
the myth impels Henry to seek its graces in the ranch
headquarters belonging to John Robinson, a neighboring
rancher and a man Henry admires because John is "the
nearest thing [Henry knows] to the old cattle barons in
the movies that he liked so much—someone on the order
of . . . John Wayne in ’McClintock.'"108
Kramer uses the character of Sam Otis, "an old cow-
puncher who had lived and worked on a neighboring ranch
for so many years that people long ago . . . began [call¬
ing it] 'Sam's place,as she uses the character of
the state trooper: both men are additional members of the
cowboy culture dominated by the cowboy myth. But where
the flat character of the state trooper simply mirrors the
myth's control over Henry Blanton, Kramer's characteriza¬
tion of Sam allows him to function in the same manner as
Plato's Critias's Solon. Plato uses the long-dead Solon
as a historical source who authorizes Plato's fallen
society by fulfilling the role of the Hellenic philosopher
in search of the knowledge residing in the ancient Egyp¬
tian metaphor Plato uses to represent the soul of Hellenic
Greece. Similarly, Kramer uses Sam Otis as a historicized
source who authorizes her myth and its opposed cycle of
change. Sam's perspective of the cowboy myth sees its
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opposition by the cycle of change as beginning with the
economic images he associates with Franklin Roosevelt's
presidency:
'You know when it all began to change?' Sam said.
'It was when that Roosevelt fella got in. . . .
That was the end--that P.W.A., or whatever they
call it. Boy, I’d of died before I got on one of
them welfare things. Your old cowpuncher—he's
got a little pride. He don't want no one taking
care of him.’110
It is Sam's condemnation of "welfare things" as "not
Western" which provides Kramer with a historically ground¬
ed sense of time through which the reader may see the
cowboy myth as the soul whose lost knowledge separates the
fallen generation of cowboys from those represented by
John Wayne and Gary Cooper. Henry Blanton's response to
Sam's indignation clarifies this perception:
'Seems to me like we been kind of breaking na¬
ture's law,' [Henry] said. ... 'I mean, the
law of nature is for the strongest to survive,
ain't it? But here we kind of take care of the
weakest. Now, don't get me wrong. I don't mind
the weakest. I mind the ones with no ambition.
Them old cowpunchers in the movies—they got what
they wanted 'cause of ambition. Else they worked
for somebody who knew how to use them. You got
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to see old Chill Wills in "The Rounders" to know
what those old cattlemen were really like.'111
It is this code of "taking care of the weakest" that
forms the "comfortable and generous" relationship between
Henry and Pepper, the nine-year-old Appaloosa that "com¬
mand [ed] Henry's tenderness and humor"ancj which
prompts Henry and the other cowboys to help George Smith,
an elderly cowboy in his seventies who "had come up in the
world the right way--starting as a cowboy, working hard
and saving money and, finally, leasing some land . . . and
filling that land with a fine small herd of cattle"11^ and
who is now physically unable to work his cattle. More
importantly, it is this application of this code of the
cowboy myth that allows Kramer to echo a Platonic device
which specifically characterizes her text as a "copy" of
Plato's "model." A farmer needing help plowing a field
calls George, asking for the name of an "old
cowpuncher . . . who'd like to make himself a little
money. "*** «phe ±armert however, is not deserving of the
assistance Blanton gives George, for Kramer's depiction of
farmers and ranchers, like Plato's sophists and philoso¬
phers, hierarchically represents the opposition between
the cycle of change and the cowboy myth. Farmers, accord¬
ing to Blanton, "ain't independent [like ranchers]. They
got to have them co-ops, just to be sure no one's taking
advantage of them. They got to have everything written
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down before they do for each other."115 Kramer's Blanton's
equating writing with dependence echoes Plato's associa¬
tion of writing with the Hellenes who were damned by their
failure to recall the dialectical means of attaining
knowledge. All Solon can do when asked by the Egyptian
priest to historicize Hellene antiquity is recite a ge¬
nealogy of names. Yet, Plato also uses writing, the only
means by which he can manipulate time and sequence, to
authorize his creation of the world. Similarly, Kramer
uses writing to authorize the critical juncture which most
clearly empowers her proposition concerning culture and
myth. For it is Blanton’s failure at writing which brings
the conflict between the myth which dominates Blanton's
culture and thus his life and the cycle of change which
opposes it to a climax.
Kramer notes that an important symbol of the cowboy
myth is the handshake: "A cowboy [shakes] hands where
ordinary men [sign] contracts [just as] a cowboy [draws]
his gun where ordinary men [go] home."116 Blanton expands
the symbol into dictum, stating,
'Seems to me a man’s handshake ought to be
enough. My Granddaddy Abel never signed no
contract. My granddaddy always said a man's word
should be his contract, and that's what I do
believe, and that's what any cowboy
believes, . . . and that's how I'm going to
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live. ’11'
Blanton's handshake thus forms the contractual arrangement
binding the agreement between Blanton and Lester Hill, the
ranch manager, to become egual owners of a "batch of Okie
calves that Lester had bought, with a bank loan, through
-tip
an agent in Louisiana."AXO Under the terms of the agree¬
ment, Blanton was to care for the calves for a season
while they foraged with the ranch cattle. At the end of
the season, Blanton and Lester would split equally the
profits gained from the calves' sale. Despite George
Smith's warning that Blanton should get "something down on
paper about that deal of yours" and Betsy's fearful obser¬
vation that "Lester is always taking advantage of
[Henry],"xx Blanton persists in his dream of acquiring
wealth through the cowboy myth just as George Smith had.
After adding up the profit on "a hundred calves, bought
cheap, grazed well, and sold at the Amarillo Livestock
Auction with a lot of water bringing up their weight,"120
Blanton'8 future is decided; he will invest those profits
in another hundred head, sell them, and then purchase two
hundred head. Thus, "in a few years, he would have the
cash for a down payment on a few sections of his own."121
Blanton's dream comes to an abrupt end on "a day in
June when summer seemed to settle over the Panhandle like
1 o o
a cloak of heat." Henry receives Lester's catastrophic
call over the two-way radio Lester installed in the truck
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and Blanton keeps turned off when he "tour[s] the ranch
alone or [performs] the chores at headquarters."12^ To
Blanton, the radio represents a challenge to his authority
as foreman of the Willow ranch and to his perception of
himself as the heroic, solitary cowboy; for Kramer's
proposition, the radio functions as the device that actu¬
alizes the ruinous feelings of inadequacy and fear that,
like the feelings of affirmation and hope, result from a
myth's domination of a culture. Lester wants "his" calves
rounded up, for the summer heat and the lack of rain
promise drought, and he has an offer for the calves that
amounts to "just enough to cover his costs. . . . And
Henry would understand that [Lester] couldn't risk losing
money on a droughty summer, not with a bank loan
due. . . . Lester concludes his apocryphal communica¬
tion with Henry with a weak appeal to their friendship:
"'I sure appreciate your taking care of this. ... I
mean, I wouldn't want you going to no trouble with them
calves. Not on my account. But, hell, friends is
friends—right?’"12^ Henry's response is to drive to
town, get drunk, and drive home again, arriving in the
courtyard "too drunk to move."12® This inability to act
represents the static nature of his life under the domina¬
tion of the cowboy myth, a nature Henry admits when he
tells Betsy, after she manages to get him out of the
truck, "'I guess this is the other part of cowboying,
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ain't it? The part when all the craziness comes out.'"
Moreover, Sam Otis's response to Henry's collapsed world
highlights his secondary role as Henry's emotional spokes¬
man, for Sam can say what Henry's powerless character
cannot: M'My gun, where's my gun. . . . Now, why didn't I
use that gun this morning? What do I got to live
for?'"128
The affirmation and hope in the cowboy myth, although
greatly weakened, provide Henry with a limited means of
avoiding physical suicide. Ironically, however, the feel¬
ings bring him not back into the grace of the myth but
into a vengeful, "noncowboy" act representative of the
cycle of change opposed to the myth. While sitting at the
kitchen table with Betsy and Sam, listening to Betsy's
attempts to convince Sam that he still has a life worth
living, Henry contradicts Sam’s definition of cowpunching
by relying once more on the cowboy's code of assisting the
weak. Cowpunching is not roping or riding a horse or even
being smart; rather cowpunching is "thinking enough about
a dumb animal to go out in the rain or snow and try to
save that cow. Not for the guy that owns the cow but for
that poor cow and her calf. It's getting down in that
bog--m quicksand, if you got the guts."
Henry's definition, an explanation based on the cowboy
code, which insists on helping the weak and which illumi¬
nates the special relation with nature that characterizes
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the mythical cowboy, leads him to commit an act of revenge
that takes him from the protective affirmation of the myth
and into the deadly cycle of change. After spending the
night in his pickup because he does not "have the heart to
face Betsy with the news that his deal with Lester [is]
over,"^® Henry sees some of the large Brangus studs from
the neighboring ranch trying to mate with his smaller and
"weaker" heifers. Saddling Pepper, he rides the pasture,
finding a heifer "sprawled flat and frothing—and so
1 *3 I
worked over she could not get up."XJX Roping one of the
bulls, Henry works him "hard" until the exhausted bull is
lying on the ground. Taking out his knife, Henry pro¬
claims, "'The way I see it, it's like you had a daughter
and she was raped.’"132 He then castrates the bull, and
in so doing commits economic suicide. In the cowboy
culture, such a "noncowboy" act is akin to rustling.
Blanton realizes this, and the momentary satisfaction he
gains fades with the roping of the second bull. Blanton
"(knows] he [is] not expressing right--not expressing
right at all--but . . . there [is] nothing he [can] do
about it."133
Kramer's final actualization of the full power of her
proposition that a myth's domination of a culture results
in its members feeling the contradictory emotions of
inadequacy and fear and affirmation and hope invokes the
textual authority of the method underlying Plato's
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"Timaeus." In the dialogue, Plato's Tiraaeus notes that
“we must accept the traditions of the men of old time who
affirm themselves to be the offspring of the gods—that is
what they say--and they must surely have known their own
ancestors. Further, Plato's Timaeus invokes the voice
of the creator, attributing to that artisan the statement,
"Gods, children of gods, who are my works and of whom I am
the artificer and father, my creations are indissoluble,
if so I will. All that is bound may be undone, but only
an evil being would wish to undo that which is harmon¬
ious. . . .-^35 jn this fashion, Plato grounds Tiraaeus's
explanation of the creation of the world in the authority
of a creator who is both unattainable to those who wish to
counter Plato's Tiraaeus’s creation tale and is beyond
comprehension by men. The creator is "past finding
out.MiJO In addition, Plato locates Timaeus's tale in the
descriptions of long-dead ancestors who, like the creator,
are both unattainable and, as philosophers capable of
understanding the soul and its knowledge, "past finding
out" by the damned believers of this world. Kramer, the
previously demonstrated ethnographic heir to Plato’s
authority who takes Plato's place as the manipulator of
the prodding finger, textually supports her authority in a
similar fashion. Kramer's Blanton's invocation of the
"caring for the weak" code of the cowboy myth is grounded
in Blanton's long-dead grandfather who, as one of the
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mythical nineteenth-century cowboys, "took a job [as a
cowpuncher for the XIT ranch] while he saved money for a
down payment on his own spread. "■L By 1886 he had enough
money saved to make a down payment on six sections, but
low cattle prices, droughts, freezes, infectious diseases,
and high interest rates pared the ranch to a mere section
by 1918. Nonetheless, while nearly dying from influenza
during the January storms of 1919, Abel Blanton still rode
out, Mhis chest rubbed down with . . . special liniment of
camphor, bacon grease, and coal oil" to care for the
cattle that could still "walk . . . after a month of
■I "30
hunger and punishing snowstorms."x After selling the
remaining cows for "what he could get" and the last sec-
tion of land for "not much more than he had paid,"xj:'
Abel Blanton went to work once more as a cowpuncher for a
rancher who had offered him a job years earlier. He died
while working for that rancher. Moreover, Kramer as
textual artisan creates a world whose orderly domination
by the cowboy myth reflects Plato's creator's description
of a "harmonious" creation that can only be "undone" by
evil. Kramer's Henry Blanton's evil castration of the
Brangas bull thus destroys Kramer's orderly world of the
cowboy culture, thus promotes the dominative character of
Kramer's textualized authority and method as inherited
from Plato, and thus endows subsequent ethnographies in
this genre with a model embued with authoritative power.
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An examination of McPhee's Basin and Range and Kunze*s
Highroad to the Stake will reveal the dorainative features
of Kramer’s model.
Section III
"[Fictive ethnographies] offer the fresh perspectives of
some very talented and insightful . . . ethnographers who
are blissfully unconcerned with and free of the histori¬
cally routinized formats of cultural story telling."^®
By superimposing John McPhee's visage onto Socrates's
countenance and Jane Kramer's onto Plato's in Derrida’s
portrait on the postcard, a transference made easier by
John Van Maanen’s bringing Kramer's and McPhee's texts
together in his discussion of this ethnographic genre's
tendency to show "reality . . . theatrically without great
concern for interpreting the recreated world for the
audience" and to use "the writer’s . . . self as the
register and filter of worldly happeningsHarold
Bloom's process of influence which links McPhee's Basin
and Range with Kramer's text, as well as with those texts
developed by Interpretive/Translative and Realist ethnog¬
raphers and Plato, becomes apparent. For like Kramer,
McPhee occupies a link in the chain of inheritance
stretching from Plato through the Realists and Interpre-
tivists/Translativists and thus is an heir to Plato's
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method of attaining truth via a dialectical treatment of
concepts, definitions, and inference. McPhee, therefore,
acquires the authoritative power of Kramer, the Interpre-
tivists/Translativists, the Realists, and Plato through
his evocation of a rhetoric of entitlement which acquires
meaning through the discourse's dialectical symbolic
significance. As a result, McPhee occupies the objective
stance of his predecessors; within the universe of his
discourse he is the single guide to truth. In the "Timae-
us," this position is filled by Plato and is described as
capable of being employed only by the person "who has been
earnest in the love of knowledge and of true wisdom, and
has exercised . . . intellect more than any other
part . . . [and has] thoughts immortal and divine . . .
[and is thus] immortal, and . . . ever cherishing the
divine power. . . ."142 jn other words, McPhee's stance
is embued with the "divine power" that accompanies his
"earnest" pursuit of knowledge and its subsequent truth.
Within this universe of discourse, McPhee is thus domina-
tive, and as the creator of the rules guiding the text, he
is the authority.
McPhee, like Kramer and Plato, relies on a dialectical
method of using syllogistic investigations of oppositions
to develop premises needed to support a proposition. The
beginning pages of his text thus resound with a rhetoric
of opposition. The concept of the earth's poles as fixed
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positions is opposed to that which describes the poles as
constantly moving. Moreover, the motif of movement gives
rise to further oppositions: the quiet surrounding the
west apron of the George Washington Bridge on a Sunday
morning as opposed to the “gross demonstration in particle
physics-143 which occurs on weekday mornings; the rock
walls of roadcuts, symbolic of natural processes of geo¬
logic formation as opposed to the asphalt and concrete
highways which lead the “particles" from their source to
"Chicago, Cheyenne, [and] Sacramento;"144 the "Latin"
eyes, as opposed to the "Nordic" facial features, of Karen
Kleinspehn, a geologist examining the rock layers laid
bare by a New Jersey roadcut for geologic support for her
dissertation’s claim that she "and the road and the rock
before her, and the big bridge and its awsome city—in
fact, nearly the whole of the continental United States
and Canada and Mexico . . . are in a stately manner mov¬
ing;*'14^ human decorations in the form of "a huge rubber
sandal ... a crate of broken eggs, three golf
balls . . . [and a windblown] soda can" as opposed to
nature's decorations in the form of "pin oaks, sycamores,
aspens, cottonwoods, [that] have come in on the wind with
milkweed, wisteria, . . . [and the] fossil burrows in the
slate . . . where Triassic animals travelled through the
quiet mud. . . . "146 These oppositions, all bespeaking
movement, also form an image of time, a second motif
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which, when combined with the motif of movement, produces a
context within which a roadcut functions for geologists as
a "portal, a fragment of a regional story, a proscenium
arch that leads [geologists'] imaginations into the earth
and through the surrounding terrain."^7 Further, time,
divided into Cretaceous, Jurassic, Triassic, Tertiary, and
Quaternary periods, and featured in an artistic rendering
as the guiding principle in McPhee’s text, becomes the
Platonic image of Truth through which the geologist in¬
formants in McPhee's study form their dialectical argu¬
ments concerning the earth.
It is McPhee's Platonic use of time as an image of
Truth, along with his dialectical use of oppositions,
which confirms his position in the Platonic line of inher¬
itance as portrayed on Derrida's postcard. In addition,
McPhee's use of time as an image of Truth and his use of
dialectically-posed oppositions as the source of a syllo¬
gistic investigation powers his ethnography of geologists
and provides the premises supporting his proposition con¬
cerning the way myth affects a culture of scientists. If
myths are defined as "rhetorical reinforcements of
ideas . . . [myths are] 'ideological' in the sense that,
where they gain . . . currency in formal expression, they
can be shown to represent the particular perspective of
some more or less limited group, to sanction special
interests in terms of universal validity,"1^®
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then their collisions will manifest themselves in ideolog¬
ical oppositions whose rhetorics make evident the friction
between them and develop a persuasive authority based on
the rhetorics’ abilities to demonstrate "universal validi¬
ty." That this is, in fact, McPhee's proposition is
revealed in his movement and time-tinged statement of
purpose:
When I was seventeen ... I was taught the
rudiments of what is now referred to as the Old
Geology. The New Geology is the package phrase
for the effects of the revolution that occurred
in earth science in the nineteen sixties, when
geologists . . . began to discuss . . . the
interactions of some twenty parts of the
globe . . . [in terms of] plate tectonics.
[N]ow . . . middle-aged and fading, I wanted to
learn some geology again, to feel the difference
between the Old and the New. . . . ^
The names "Old" and "New" reveal the friction between the
metaphors used to represent the opposed ideologies, a
process very like the metaphorical nature of geology.
According to Kenneth Deffeyes, McPhee's primary informant,
geologists "look at mud and see mountains, in mountains
oceans, in oceans mountains to be. They go up to some
rock and figure out a story, another rock, another story,
and as the stories compile through time they connect."150
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Thus, "Old" geology becomes the study of "isostatic
adjustments and degraded channels, of angular unconformi¬
ties . . . and a formation . . . derived . . . from the
solution and collapse of another formationIt is, in
other words, a study of isolated, motionless features.
"New" geology, however, is the study of the "con¬
sequences . . . [that derive from] pulling a continent
apart . . . [the study of] surface vacanc[ies], which
[are] faulting[s], and subsurface vacanc[ies], which
[cause] upwelling[s] of hot mantle that intrudes as sills
or comes out as lava flows., j_n other words, a
study of clumped together geological features whose char¬
acteristics are metaphors for the fault blocks whose
movements tear continents apart and bring together land
masses that were previously unrelated. And the two means
of pursuing "geology" contain senses of "universal validi¬
ty" equally in conflict, notions whose confrontations
suggest the current ideological struggle between literary
structuralists who view a text in isolation and whose
conclusions are validated by the identification of pat¬
terns of identical structures in other texts and literary
"postmodernists" who, for example, view a text as part of
an evolving canon and whose conclusions are validated by,
for example, economic, psychological, or gender-based
symbol systems. Thus, McPhee, like Kramer and Plato, uses
a process of historicization to frame a "tale" so that he
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"tale" so that he might use that frame as a means of
depicting oppositions whose rhetoric develops the premises
needed to support a proposition. In McPhee's text, the
proposition is that the collision of myths in a culture of
scientists will result in what Clifford Geertz calls a
"strain,"that the culture's members attempt to ease by
developing "standards and procedures for changing the
[myths] from inside—motivating critics and helping dis¬
tinguish good modifications from bad."154 In other words,
a scientific culture's domination by conflicting myths
will reveal itself in a rhetoric similar to that of Kram¬
er's Henry Blanton; like Blanton, the geologist members of
McPhee's culture will produce a rhetoric whose character¬
istics may be described as resulting from the conflicting
emotions of inadequacy and fear and affirmation and hope.
The emotions can be seen in the metaphors used to portray
one or the other myths and in the actions taken by the
cultural members.
McPhee uses the Platonic combination of figurative
language and dialectic to invoke Plato's notion of time as
an image of Truth and to juxtapose it with both the motif
of motion and his proposition concerning myths in conflict
and the result of that conflict on the culture of scien¬
tists dominated by those myths. The resulting rhetoric of
opposition creates a world whose inhabitants who move from
geologic site to geologic site, much as traffic on an
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interstate highway does, searching for information deemed
acceptable by the "standards" and in ways held acceptable
by the "procedures" developed by the geologists to change
their myths. Thus, McPhee begins his study with a de¬
scription of his field experience grounded in both time
and motion: "I would go back and forth across [the coun¬
try] like some sort of shuttle working out on a loom,
accompanying geologists on purposes of their own or being
accompanied by them from cut to cut and coast to
■tec
coast.These journeys form the basis for his rhetori¬
cal oppositions, beginning with the oppositions between
basins, faults, and ranges, the prominent aspects of the
plate tectonic myth, the source of McPhee's text's title,
and the features indicative of McPhee's use of Plato's
method of dividing and collecting. The Pleasant Valley
basin and the Tobin range of Nevada form the context for
the first of these oppositions which takes the form of an
opposition between what is "synopsized and dismissed as
'desert'"15^ and what is described as habitable and useful
land. McPhee extends this opposition by using the animal
life characteristic of both as symbols of this opposition.
The "coyote and the pocket mouses, the side-blotched
lizard and the vagrant shrew" represent the desert, while
the "minks and river otters . . . deer and antelope . . .
pelicans [and] cormorants"^57 represent the less formida¬
ble areas. The importance of this distinction, however,
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lies in its falsehood. The animal species listed above
are part of an entire ecosystem and cannot be examined as
isolated entities. Thus, by collecting the fauna living
in the basin and range, McPhee uses them as a metaphor for
the division between Old and New geology. This distinc¬
tion reaches its climax in McPhee*s description of the
basin and range as parts of a singular consequence of
tectonic shifts. The range is "like a warship . . . [and
the basin] is an ocean of loose sediment with [the moun¬
tain range] standing in it as if they were members of a
fleet without precedentWhen combined with the
simultaneous processes of ranges rising because of tecton¬
ic pressure and ranges falling because of erosion, the
resulting geological metaphor for the opposition between
Old and New geology echoes Plato's Timaeus's gold figurine
metaphor for the opposition between Being and Becoming.
Plato's Timaeus says,
Suppose a person to make all kinds of figures of
gold and to be always remodeling each form into
all the rest; somebody points to one of them and
asks what it is. By far the safest and truest
answer is, 'That is gold,' and not to call the
triangle or any other figures which are formed in
the gold 'these,' as though they had existence,
since they are in process of change while he is
making the assertion, but if the questioner be
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willing to take the safe and indefinite expres¬
sion, ’such,’ we should be satisfied. And the
same argument applies to the universal nature
which receives all bodies. . . .
Just as Plato's Timaeus sees the figurines as composed of
a golden essence (Being) best described in terms of a
metaphorical "such" (Becoming), McPhee sees the effects of
opposed myths on his culture of geologists (Being) best
described in terms of a metaphorical relationship between
ridge and basin formation and New Geology (Becoming).
More important to this study is what McPhee's initial
set of oppositions and metaphors reveals about his reli¬
ance on Platonic method and that reliance's subsequent
affect on McPhee's sense of textual authority. First,
McPhee’s use of the myths of Old and New geology to
historicize his creation of a world of geologists mirrors
Plato's use of Critias's tale to historicize his depiction
of the creation of the world. Both writers gain a sense
of truth by grounding their creations in recognized voices
of authority. For Plato, these are the voices of Solon
and Critias; for McPhee, these are the voices of his
informants: "Karen Kleinspehn . . . David Love, of the
United States Geological Survey . . . Eldreidge Moores, of
the University of California at Davis . . . [and] Kenneth
Deffeyes of Princeton University."*^® Second, as record¬
ing secretary for his informants, McPhee, like Plato with
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Solon, Critias, and Socrates, hegemonizes their voices,
changing the dialogue between the geologists and McPhee to
a monologue which presents McPhee's as the voice (pen) of
authority. Thus, McPhee, like Plato, uses writing to
textualize his dominative authority. Third, as the only
"philosopher" in a textual world inhabited by myth domi¬
nated geologist believers, McPhee is the sole guide capa¬
ble of dialectically leading the reader to the truth
inherent in his portrayal of the effects myth domination
has on this world. The two hypotheses concerning Fictive
ethnography stated after the analysis of the "Timaeus"
therefore appear to continue to be accurate. Plato’s face
does change to McPhee’s, while Socrates's persona takes on
the characteristics of the field geologist. In light of
this initial confirmation of the first hypothesis, the
first portion of McPhee's text appears to validate the
second hypothesis as well. The monologic ethnography
which is the product of the dialogues which occurred
during McPhee's "shuttle-like" journeys across the country
reproduces the soul of the Platonic model. An examination
of the remainder of McPhee's text will indicate the con¬
tinued strength of the hypotheses.
McPhee continues developing the metaphor begun with
his listing of the animal species living in the Pleasant
Valley basin and on the Tobin range by using them to show
that the basin and range do not form a desert of isolated
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geological features. Instead, the basin and range are
"alive" with surface and subsurface life. Below the
animals and the sage,
[t]he earth is moving. The faults are moving.
There are hot springs all over the province.
There are young volcanic rocks. Fault scars
everywhere. The world is splitting open and
coming apart. You see a sudden break in the
sage . . . and it says to you that a fault is
there and a fault block is coming up. This
Nevada topography is what you see during mountain
building. This is the tectonic, active, spread¬
ing, mountain-building world. ^1
The further development of the metaphor, however, has the
same result as the original; by portraying the living
"tectonic" world as a metaphor for the New geology myth
and the "desert" world as a metaphor for the Old geology
myth, McPhee places the two myths in a collision of proc¬
ess and product. Moreover, since the living world of New
geology resounds with the Plato's Timaeus's vision of the
world as "a living creature truly endowed with soul and
intelligence by the providence of God"1^ and the desert
world of Old Geology is permeated by Plato's Timaeus’s
description of "sensible things . . . apprehended by
opinion and sense, New geology becomes, in Platonic
terms, the realm of the philosopher while Old geology
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becomes the realm of the sophists. It is thus New geolo¬
gy * s duty to provide the standards and procedures for
easing the "strain" resulting from the myths' collision.
Finally, as the chronicler of the metaphors depicting this
culture, McPhee's position of authority, like Plato's is
assured through his fully premised syllogistic investiga¬
tion of the rhetorical oppositions created by the meta¬
phors .
The second major metaphor McPhee creates in his rheto¬
ric of oppositions is one of water, a metaphor which is
coherently linked with the earlier image of a battleship¬
like mountain range afloat in an ocean-like basin and
which shows the "basin-range fault blocks . . . floating
on the mantle."16* Although the mantle is solid, its
"white hot . . . but magisterially viscous [nature]
permit[s] the crust above it to 'float.*"165 Through the
concept of "isostatic adjustment," then, a fault block
acts much like a block of wood held under water. When
released, the wooden block "adjusts itself to the surface
isostatically. A frog sits on the wood. It goes down.
He vomits. It goes up a little. He jumps. It
adjusts."166 Thus, when, for example, periods of glacia¬
tion add the weight of miles of ice upon a portion of the
surface of the earth, the fault blocks under the earth's
crust at that point are compressed downward like the block
of wood. The resultant pressure causes adjacent fault
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blocks that are not affected by the ice to push upwards,
creating mountain ranges whose rock layers show the layers
of silt, sand and mud that, because of the pressure and
heat caused by the block's previous position, have turned
to siltstone, sandstone, and shale. When the glacial ice
melts, the area under its influence rises, but subsequent
erosion from the newly-raised range contributes additional
material which again compresses the area vacated by the
glacial ice. Thus, the basin surrounding the mountain
"warship" develops from the same process that forms the
range. Further, just as the submerged block of wood
brings up water when it surfaces, "when a mountain range
1 fi 7
comes up into the air, a whole lot comes up with it."*1-0
This extra material includes "magma . . . [and where there
is a fracture] water . . . rich in dissolved
minerals . . . [such as] silver, tungsten, copper, [and]
gold.”168
Solidified in pockets, cracks, and seams in the sur¬
rounding rocks, the minerals drew to Nevada the miners
whose futures were tied to exploiting the Pleasant Valley
basin and Tobin range and assist in drawing geologist
Deffeyes and accompanying ethnographer McPhee to this
specific basin and range. As McPhee notes, "[Deffeyes
comes to Nevada] seeking insight into the way in which the
rifting earth comes apart. His ideas about silver, on the
other hand, may send his children to college."169
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More importantly, McPhee's water metaphor draws the spirit
of Plato’s model into McPhee’s copy through its invocation
of Plato’s Timaeus's dialectical creation of the world.
For just as Plato's Timaeus uses the elements of earth,
air, fire, and water as "general affections of the whole
body" may be perceived, McPhee uses geological features
as visible images through which the "general affections"
of the tectonic myth may be perceived. Further, just as
Plato’s Timaeus uses "the whole body" as a visible image
of God making the world "the fairest and best, out of
things which were not fair and good”17* and thus of the
soul, McPhee uses his embodiment of tectonic myth as a
visible image of a dominant myth in action. Deffeyes’s
standards and procedures used to collect and divide infor¬
mation are formed according to the myth’s precepts; he is
thus drawn to Nevada by the promise its geology holds for
either supporting or changing the tectonic myth through
maintaining or reworking the metaphorical relation between
"the subtle differences in the histories of one fault
block and another"and the New geology's portrait of
the earth. As a result, the rhetorical oppositions be¬
tween New and Old geology, between the earth's mantle and
the fault blocks, between the fault blocks themselves, and
between range and basin generated by the water metaphor
support the premise established by McPhee's original
metaphor of life and motion.
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As McPhee did with his initial metaphor, he extends
the water metaphor. This extension of the second metaphor
further follows the first one in that it, too, creates an
opposition McPhee uses to support his premise. In the
case of the second metaphor, however, the opposition is a
climactic one; the "change in world climate that made ice
in the north temporarily preempted [the preceding climac¬
tic conditions] and dropped into the Great Basin torrents
from the sky."x J The water metaphor thus broadens,
taking in not only the earth's fault blocks and mantle,
but also the mountains and basins themselves, thereby
strengthening the "battleship" image of the mountains.
According to McPhee, the resulting "big lakes in time
connected the basinsand formed the inland "seas"
exemplified by Lake Manlius, now Death Valley. Another of
these large bodies of water, Lake Bonneville, spread to
the size of Lake Michigan and then "sat there for thou¬
sands of years with limestone terraces forming and waves
cutting benches at the shoreline."Subsequent periods
of dryness forced Bonneville to shrink, forming eventually
Great Salt Lake. The importance, however, to McPhee lies
in the water's hegemonic capacity. Like Plato’s Timaeus's
account in which
the world has received animals, mortal and immor¬
tal, and is fulfilled with them, and has become a
visible animal containing the visible--the
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sensible God who is the image of the intellectu¬
al, the greatest, best, fairest, most perfect,176
McPhee's account, through the water metaphor’s ability to
dominate and control the geology of the earth, becomes a
"visible animal" of the tectonic myth's domination of the
geologists' culture.
The Great Salt Lake provides the geographic feature
McPhee uses to link coherently his third metaphorical
opposition, the seasonal opposition between winter and
summer, with his second metaphor. Noting that he has seen
"the salt lake incredibly beautiful in winter dusk under
snow-streamer curtains of cloud moving fast through the
sky, with the wall of the Wasatch a deep rose and the lake
islands rising from what seemed to be rippled slate,"177
McPhee rhetorically opposes the stark beauty of the
isolated features emphasized by the Old geology myth with
his summertime immersion in the salt lake's waters.
McPhee collects eggstones, made from layers of calcium
carbonate compressed around a silica core, from the bottom
of the lake while the salt water "trying to pull fresh
water through [his] skin . . . closed [his] pores tight
and [caused his] lips to swell and become slightly
numb."178 The eggstones symbolically link Great Salt Lake
with the tectonic myth, for New geologists "inferentially"
associate them with a "shallow, lime-rich Cambrian sea"179
created during the climatic change following the tectonic
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formation of the basin and range. Further, the tectonic
myth's explanatory power over the birth, life, and death,
of ranges and basins is demonstrated in the summertime
life cycle attached to the Great Salt Lake:
On the firm flat beach of the Great Salt Lake
were many hundreds of thousands of brine
flies—broad dark patches of them hopping and
buzzing a steady collective electrical hum. A
sacred gull made short bursts through the brine
flies, its bill clapping. Three years before
gulls ate crickets and saved the Mormons, Kit
Carson shot gulls to feed the starving emigrants.
Now, at the end of spring runoff, dead creatures
were everywhere.*®®
McPhee extends this seasonal metaphor to the ancient
shores of California's Lake Bonneville, where, in the
company of New geologist Kenneth Deffeyes, the winter
winds blow the snow from the rocks of a roadcut and reveal
a sheer and massive section of handsome blue
rock, thinly bedded, evenly bedded, forty metres
high. Its parallel planes [tilted] ... to the
east, with the exception of some confused and
crumpled material that suggested ... a broken
down doorway in an otherwise undamaged wall.
The fact that this rock is "not a manifestation of some
major tectonic event [but is] an item for an inside
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page"x indicates both the metaphorical relationship
between the winter and Old geology. McPhee uses similarly
the tropical climate of Bonaire to represent the metaphor¬
ical relation between the summer and New geology and to
once again tie his informant, Kenneth Deffeyes, to the New
geology myth. McPhee notes that following graduate
school, Deffeyes went to Bonaire and found "a lagoon that
was concentrating under the sun . . . 'making a juice very
rich in magnesium’ [that was] flowing through the lime-
stone below and changing it into dolomite." This was
the same blue rock revealed by the winter wind near Lake
Bonneville. The important aspect here is in the different
treatment of the dolomite by the followers of the opposed
myths. Where Old geology treats dolomite as simply a form
of limestone, New geology treats dolomite as representi-
tive of the "Picture": "The [eggstones] and dolomite—tuff
and granite, the . . . siltstones and shales—are pieces
of the Picture. The stories that go with them . . . may
well, as stories, stand on their own, but all are frag¬
ments of the Picture."184 Thus, the magnesium "juice"
needed to change limestone to dolomite and carried by
water circulated through a fissure in the fault bordering
a block, represents the process illuminating the
"Picture."
In this manner, alternating between the winter and
summer perspectives whose oppositions reveal rhetorically
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the myths of Old and New geology, McPhee and Deffeyes move
"along from roadcut to roadcut, range to range, like
barnyard poultry pecking up rock, seeing what the fault
blocks had lifted from below."185 Moreover, the summer¬
time views of the grain-like remains of the material
lifted by the fault blocks are grounded in juxtaposed
images of time, showing the diacronic nature of New geolo¬
gy's tectonic process as opposed to the synchronic nature
of Old geology's products. According to McPhee, the blue
dolomite of both Bonaire and Lake Bonneville
approached five hundred million years. Captain
Howard Stansbury, USA, whose name would rest upon
the mountains of which the [dolomite] was a
component, was approaching fifty when he came
into the Great Basin in 1849. With sixteen
mules, a water keg, and some India-rubber bags, he
circumambulated the lake. . . . People told him
not to try it. He ran out of water but not of
luck. And he came back with a story of having
seen . . . scattered books, clothing, trunks,
[and] tools.186
These were weighty objects left by the luckless Donner
Party who passed this way in 1846. More importantly, the
images of the Donner Party's cast-off materials invokes
the cast-off material from the rising fault blocks sought
by Deffeyes and McPhee, and the life and death struggle of
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the California-bound settlers invokes the diachronic story
of the life and death of ranges and basins told by New
geology's tectonic myth.
The winter metaphor attached to Old geology further
provides McPhee with a means of historicizing his key
informant, Kenneth Deffeyes. By relating Deffeyes's
education and subsequent career to a skier's run down a
slope, Deffeyes's education in Old geology, his move to
the New geology's myth, and the acknowledgement by his
fellow pursuers of New geology's "Picture" of his authori¬
ty become concrete:
. . . outclassed [by the other skiers] on his own
team, [the skier's] day came when a great white-
out sent the superstars sprawling on the moun¬
tain. [The skier's] turn for the slalom came
late in the afternoon, and just as he was moving
toward the gate the whiteout turned to alpenglow,
suddenly bringing into focus the well-compacted
snow. He shoved off, and was soon bombing. He
went down the mountain like an object dropped
from a tower. In the end, his time placed him
high among the ranking stars.187
Juxtaposed with the coldness of the Old geology's ski
slope is the heat surrounding New geology's fault blocks.
McPhee's Deffeyes notes the importance of this heat to the
tectonic myth: above the fault block, the earth's crust is
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"brittle"; around and below the block lies the "plastic"
ocean of the heated mantle. "’If the temperature gradient
were different and the cold brittle zone went down . . .
1 DO
the blocks would not have mechanical freedom.'" In
other words, without the heat, the fault blocks could not
move, and the tectonic myth would be powerless, locked in
the frozen grip of Old geology's myth.
McPhee's fourth major metaphor, a metaphor which
reveals the opposition between tunnel and panoramic vision
and thus the perspectives derived from the myths of Old
and New geology, brings the reader through the tunnel at
Carlin Canyon, Nevada, into the daylight illuminating New
geology. Moreover, the tunnel metaphor invokes the power
of the previous metaphors of life and water, for the
geological focal point in the canyon, "two . . . rock
formations, awry to each other, awry to the gyroscope of
the earth--just stuck together there like two artistic
impulses,"1®9 is diminished by the surrounding junipers
and the "Humboldt River . . . flowing toward us . . . sage
and green meadow beside it, and dry russet uplands rising
behind."19® Nonetheless, the key to understanding the
formation of this ecosystem is New geology's perspective
of the rock formations whose upper, stratified layers of
"sedimentary rock, put down originally in and beside the
sea, where they had lain, initially, flat . . . were
dipping more than sixty degrees, and the strata of the
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lower part . . . were standing almost straight up on
end." Whereas the tunnel vision of Old geology would
focus on the rock formations as isolated entities, New
geology's vision allows for the development of the entire
area. As McPhee's Deffeyes says,
'to account for [those formations] you had to
build a mountain range, destroy it, and then
build a second set of mountains in the same
place, and then for the most part destroy them.
[The tectonic] forces that had compressed the
region and produced mountains would have tilted
the . . . conglomerate, not to the vertical,
where it stood now, but to something like forty-
five degrees. That mountain range wore
away . . . [and was] eventually covered by a sea.
In the water, the new sediment of the upper
formation would have accumulated gradually . . .
and later the [tectonic] forces building a fresh
mountain range would have shoved, lifted, and
rotated the whole package ... to its present
position. '
It is this explanation of the Carlin Canyon ecosystem,
grounded in the Platonic treatment of time as an image of
Truth, which represents the myth of New geology's conflict
with the myth of Old geology, a conflict, McPhee states,
identical with the conflict between the myths of Old
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geology and theology in the eighteenth century. For it
was a rock formation in Scotland identical in structure to
the ones in Carlin Canyon "that helped to bring the histo¬
ry of the earth . . . out of theological metaphor and into
1 Q 3
the perspectives of actual time." "Conventional," or
theological, wisdom, written by Abraham Werner of the
Freiberg Mining Academy, envisioned an earth "five thou¬
sand [to] six thousand years old" whose rocks "of every
kind . . . had precipitated out of solution in a globe-
1 q a
engulfing sea.,,A7n Moreover, according to McPhee, some
"contemporary [New] geologists discern in Werner the
lineal antecedence of what has come to be known as black¬
box [Old] geology."195
Within this context, all competing geological
explanations that "failed to resemble [Werner's] picture
[were] described ... as heresies [and] 'visionary fab¬
rics.'" 195 Included within this heretical group was James
Hutton’s book which described the Lammermuir Hills, the
Scottish version of the Carlin Canyon formations as cliffs
in which "the strata of the lower formation had been
upturned to become vertical columns, on which rested the
Old Red Sandstone, like the top of a weather-beaten
table.Hutton is therefore seen by New geologists as
their myth's founding father, an ancestor whose position
amidst "the direct antagonism between science and theology
[created when] geologists began to impugn the Mosaic
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account of the creation, "±:70 foreshadows their own position
between the conflicting myths of Old and New geology.
Having thus depicted the feelings of inadeguacy and
fear the New geologist members of this scientific culture
reveal in their rituals defined by their dominating myth
and in their descriptions of Old geology's myth defined by
the collision of the two myths, McPhee portrays the con¬
tradictory feelings of affirmation and hope created by the
New geologists' dominant myth in Deffeyes's search for
silver in the Sonoma Range of Nevada. Buoyed by the
tectonic myth's depiction of hydrothermal activity as
occurring in the faults between blocks where water and
magma come into contact, Deffeyes searches for the places
where the heated water carried precious metals into the
cracks and fissures of the rock brought to the surface by
rising fault blocks. In the Sonoma Range, "the crustal
blocks . . . pulled apart . . . and springs boiled up
along the faults [thus depositing] silver throughout the
Basin and Range."x Erosion, however, broke up the
deposits, causing them to concentrate in specific loca¬
tions, and rainfall changed the "silver sulphides to
silver chloride, heavy stuff that stayed right where it
was and--through thousands of millennia--increased in
concentration as more rain fell."^0 It was on these
concentrated locations that nineteenth-century mining
towns "with names like Hardscrabble, Gouge Eye, Battle
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Mountain/ [and] Treasure were built and where
fortunes were made and lost. Thus, Deffeyes's search, an
act based on the senses of affirmation and hope created by
domination of the New geology myth, focuses on "the sec¬
ondary recovery of silver"20^ from small mines "that
produced more than a certain number of dollars' worth of
silver between 1860 and 1900"205 and that were overlooked
by twentieth-century prospectors. As a result, McPhee,
accompanied by Deffeyes, finds himself "crawling like a
Japanese beetle across the face of [an unidentified]
mountain"20^ in the Sonoma Range. In the tailings of an
old mine located at the head of a canyon through which
flowed a "little stream [surrounded by] a jumble of boul¬
ders, testimony of the floods, with phreatophytes around
the boulders like implanted spears,"205 Deffeyes digs "a
little plastic-lined pond of weak cyanide"205 with which
he treats rock suspected of containing silver.
Eventually, he would discover "a blue streak in the tail¬
ings [that] would come in at fifty-eight ounces a ton"207
and would result in his having "a five-pound ingot of raw
silver on the floor, propping open the door [of his port¬
able laboratory]."200 At the same time, Deffeyes's
friend, Jason Morgan, the geologist whose paper "defined
the boundaries and motions of the [tectonic] plates
[decided] the most exciting thing to do next would be to
prove the theory [the myth on which New geology is based]
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wrong.' According to McPhee, such an achievement "would
be a reversal comparable to the debunking of Genesis"210
and the "debunking" of Old Geology. Thus, the process of
affirmation is completed; Deffeyes finds the rewards
promised by his myth, McPhee finds the final actualization
of his proposition, and the reader finds yet another heir
to Plato’s sense of textual authority.
Michael Kunze continues the dominative nature of
rhetorical opposition as a means of constructing textual
authority begun by Plato and maintained by Kramer and
McPhee in his Highroad to the Stake. For just as Plato
uses Critias's tale, as Kramer uses the myth of the Ameri¬
can Old West, and as McPhee uses the myths of Old and New
geology, Kunze uses the tale of an early seventeenth-
century Bavarian family accused of witchcraft to histori-
cize his ethnography of that time period's Bavarian cul¬
ture. Further, like Plato's Critias and Kramer's and
McPhee's personae who listen to their informants' words
until they are "branded" into memory or recorded into
"stacks" of notebooks, Kunze reads his informants' words
in the official documents of the witchcraft trial and
textually "amplifies" their voices so that his "'heroes'
speak for themselves; they tell us what they felt and
thought, what they put their faith in, and what inspired
their doubts; they tell us of their remedies for poverty
and sickness; they tell us how they played and laughed,
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suffered and dreamed."211
The most important similarity between the four texts,
however, is Kunze's reliance on the dialectical method of
using a syllogistic examination of rhetorical oppositions
to develop the premises needed to support a proposition.
While Kunze's proposition, like Kramer’s and McPhee's,
differs from Plato's, the goals are the same: all four
writers historicize tales in order to support their depic¬
tions of cultures. Kunze's descriptions of the Bavarians'
lives is grounded historically in an age over which "dark
clouds hung . . . unseen, but manifest[ed in] the great
war presaged by all the omens [as] the most terrible of
all, the ultimate conflict to be endured by mankind."212
As a result, Kunze's seventeenth-century Bavarians, like
Kramer’s Henry Blanton and McPhee's Kenneth Deffeyes, are
placed in the position of Plato's believers. Thus, the
Bavarians become representative of the opposition between
the philosopher's (ethnographer's) perception of the soul
(myth) and the believers' (informants') perception of
sensibles, as well as Kenneth Burke's notion of the ideo¬
logical aura surrounding the transcendental rhetoric
needed to move hierarchically from one to the other. The
Bavarian's voices as recorded in Kunze's source documents,
therefore, cannot dispute Kunze's observations, for their
words are dominated by Kunze's words. In this fashion,
Kunze, like McPhee, Kramer, and Plato, uses writing to
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textualize his authority. Moreover, as the only "philoso¬
pher" in a textual world inhabited by believers, Kunze is
the only guide capable of dialectically leading the reader
to the truth of his mythic portrait of seventeenth-century
Bavarians.
It seems, then, that the two hypotheses concerning the
relationship between Plato and Fictive ethnographers are
initially supported. The Preface of Kunze's text reveals
the same ideologic and hegemonic characteristics identi¬
fied in Plato’s "Timaeus." Derrida's portrait of Plato's
relationship with Socrates thus changes, allowing So¬
crates's features to take on those of Kunze. Further
evolution of Derrida’s protrait, following the above
analysis of Kunze's text, shows Plato's face changing to
Kunze’s, while Socrates’s visage becomes the face of an
early seventeenth-century Bavarian. In light of this
apparent confirmation of the first hypothesis, the Preface
to Kunze's text appears to similarly validate the second
hypothesis. The monologic ethnography which is the
product of the interviews and transcripts contained in the
Bavarian documents reproduces the soul of the Platonic
model of textual authority. An examination of the rest of
Kunze's text will indicate the continued strength of the
hypotheses.
Kunze uses Plato's combination of dialectic and figu¬
rative language to invoke Plato's notion of time as an
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image of Truth and to affix that sense of Truth to his
proposition that the Catholic Christianity myth's domina¬
tion of seventeenth-century Bavaria results in the same
effects seen in other myth-dominated cultures: the Bavar¬
ians reveal the opposed feelings of fear and inadequacy
and affirmation and hope through the oppositions which
make up their lives. The resulting rhetoric of opposition
creates a Weltanschauung Kunze describes as a "stable
order that distinguish[es] between superiority and inferi¬
ority, between heaven and hell, angels and demons.
The world of seventeenth-century Bavaria, therefore, is a
world in which its Christian inhabitants' actions reflect
symbolically Kenneth Burke's notion of the "negativistic
principle of guilt implicit in the nature of order.
According to Kunze, the Bavarians' acts manifest their
beliefs in the Catholic myth's ability to place a "halo"
around their self-interests, thereby leading them to a
sense of hope affirmed by their not having to "feel
ashamed" of those acts: through the myth's power, becoming
"wealthier and more powerful . . . [allows the Bavarian
people to] avert the disaster that threatens [them]."^15
Yet, these feelings of hope and affirmation are coun¬
tered by the myth's power to evoke equally the feelings of
inadequacy and fear. These feelings manifest themselves
in Kunze's descriptions of the Bavarians' attempts to
escape the myth's domination. The Bavarians
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plunged into dissipation, indulged in sumptuous
feasts, reeled and reveled in dances that grew
ever wilder--or else they hoarded, scrimped, and
saved. Men cursed or mocked their Lord, or else
they donned sackcloth and ashes . . . [and]
prayed and did penance.216
The feelings of fear and inadequacy, however, reveal
themselves more completely in the Bavarians' search for
scapegoats, a search which makes concrete Burke's sense of
"the sacrificial principle of victimage [in which] the
line of exposition might be summed up thus: If order, then
guilt; if guilt, then need for redemption; but any such
'payment' is victimage [scapegoating]."217 The foreboding
atmosphere which Kunze wraps around this world is charac¬
terized by the "fire and the stake," the focal points of a
people "whose hearts are struck with terror [and as a
result find] relief [by] stand[ing] in the midst of a
seething mob . . . point[ing] to a 'culprit,' and . . .
cry[ing] 'Burn him!’"216 Moreover, these focal points are
the source of the major portion of Kunze's text's title.
The atmosphere is further clouded by Kunze's observation
that "the relief gained by the threatened mob from the
victims' screams and the crackling of the fire is short¬
lived. The dense smoke that rises from such conflagra¬
tions serves only to make the sky darker, to render the
general menace all the more obvious."219
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Kunze's recreation of seventeenth-century Bavarian cul¬
ture, then, results in a picture of a culture dominated by
a myth which generates a cycle of hope and affirmation and
fear and inadequacy through its depiction of order. The
culture's members thus follow the cycle; hope and affirma¬
tion promotes the development of knowledge and wise men,
while "fear turns [the same] wise men into simpletons,
makes the just unjust, the pious wicked, and the meek
ferocious. Further, by following this cycle created
by a dominant myth, the reader comes to an understanding
of "how [the Bavarian] legal authorities [could transform]
the superstitious belief in witchcraft into a refined and
dogmatic criminal code.
The similarity between Kunze's opening paragraphs and
the beginnings of Plato's Critias's and Plato's Timaeus's
narratives emphasizes the relationship Plato describes
between the model and the copy; one shares the soul of the
other. More specifically, Kunze's beginning description
of a Bavaria dominated by a myth evokes Plato's Critias's
opposition between grace and damnation, between knowledge
and belief, between the philosopher and the believer. In
addition, Kunze's Preface creates an opposition between
the ethnographer and his informants which mirrors Plato's
Critias's oppositions. The inscribing ethnographer can
historicize the informants' words through a created con¬
text inaccessible to the informants' perceptions of the
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sensibles which make up his world just as Plato's Critias
can historicize knowledge unattainable to his ancestors or
Solon.
Kunze continues the rhetoric of opposition necessary
for developing the premises supporting his proposition by
opposing the worlds of the city-dwelling citizens of
Munich, the Bavarian capital, the rural peasants, and the
State's government. From the perspective of the citizens
of Munich, the carts approaching the city carry the sym¬
bols of growing wealth and power: the "loads of spices,
silks, and glasses from the celebrated commercial center
of Nuremberg, sumptuous cloth from England and Flanders,
wines from the Rhine and the Main."222 From the perspec¬
tive of the peasants "who [sit] chained together in [a]
cart lurching and creaking its way toward [Munich's]
Schwabing Gate,"22^ their conveyance carries a very dif¬
ferent load: their "doleful thoughts and downcast
hearts,"224 for they are coming to Munich to die. From
the perspecive of the state government, the cart filled
with the "riffraff of the most disreputable kind, miscre¬
ants under arrest"^^ carries a third load: its cargo
consists of "depraved and fiendish . . . individuals [who]
had been on the most intimate terms with Satan."22^
Looming above these perceptions is the skyline of Munich
in which "the twin onion towers of the Church of Our Lady,
and the tower of St. Peter’s, massive in its lower part,
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and delicately proportioned higher up, [dominate] the
other buildings and [show] the approaching stranger where
the heart of the city [lies]."^ Kunze's initial de¬
scription of the setting of the upcoming witchcraft trial
develops a set of oppositions that reveal the contradicto¬
ry feelings of affirmation and hope and fear and inadequa¬
cy generated by the myth which hovers over everything in
or around Munich and that provide a premise supporting
Kunze’s proposition concerning myth-dominated societies.
Initially, at least, the actions of this world's inhabi¬
tants, as represented by their commercial, architectural,
and legal developments, reflect the feelings generated by
the myth.
Kunze continues to support this premise with opposi¬
tions reflecting the distinctions between the citizenry
and the clergy and the citizenry and the court of Duke
Maximilian I of Bavaria. Noting that in 1594 "complaints
[by the common citizens of Munich] had been voiced in the
town hall that the citizens were only a tiny group in
comparison with the court and the clergy," Kunze
phrases the Church's response in economic terms: the
Church had recently hired "all the available bricklayers
and carpenters, painters and masons ... to build the
9 9 Q
Jesuit College.Duke Maximilian responds similarly,
stating that the court's presence in Munich attracts
"foreigners: traders eager to sell their wares, artists
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keen to display their talents, diplomats seeking to exert
their influence. As a result, there [are] plenty of
pickings for the townsfolk. . . . Nevertheless, the
common citizens still felt their concerns were not being
addressed. After all, Maximilian still has "whole streets
of houses torn down in order to erect churches, monaster¬
ies, and mansions,"231 edifices whose dominance over the
remainder of the city reflect the presence of the dominant
Catholic myth in both theological and secular aspects of
the culture. Around the "churches, monasteries, and man¬
sions," in a chaotic tumble whose juxtaposition with the
more imposing buildings reveals the distinction between
clergy and citizenry and between the court and the citi¬
zenry, lies the city in which
the houses . . . are either pinched and narrow or
broad and rambling; [they] follow the often
tortuous lines of the streets, crammed together,
seldom in regular rows. At one point a building
towers above its neighbors, thrusting a gallery
or a bay window far out into the street; at
another point a workshop with its stall obstructs
the thoroughfare at ground level.232
Scattered amongst this disorder are the city's "forty-two
wine shops . . . [and] fourteen alehouses [whose scenes]
of wild carousing"233 highlight the feelings of fear and
inadequacy in the city's population.
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The omnipresence of the Catholic myth in Munich
strengthens the distinction Kunze draws between the city’s
common inhabitants and the clergy and court. Kunze notes
that "when the church bells [ring] out the Angelus in the
evening, every [common] inhabitant in Munich [is] required
by ducal decree to kneel down in the street."^34 This
sense of separation and domination grows stronger in
Kunze's linking together the realms of secular law and
church attendance. Once a year, the common citizens of
Munich roust present to "the duke's officers . . . [their]
certificates of confession; anyone who [fails] to go to
confession [ends] up in jail."^35 In addition, this
portion of the citizenry of Munich, as well as the rest of
the common subjects in Bavaria, is subject to Duke Maxi¬
milian’s council of state's Church-sanctioned duty of
implement[ing] and maintain[ing] . . . public order and
other matters of manuduction.’in other words, one of
the principal tasks of the Duke's council of state, a
court-like committee consisting of the Duke's chief jus¬
tice, or "high commissioner of police, "237 ancj Qther
Church judiciary scholars, is to manage directly every
aspect of the lives of the duke’s common subjects. The
council, therefore, elicits decrees
against ostentatious dress and excessive drink¬
ing, against the marriage of young Catholics into
Protestant communities, against the sale of
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nonCatholic books, against mixed bathing, against
dancing in the evenings, against extravagant
weddings, against card games and skittles,
against an unbridled increase in swearing and
blasphemy, against fortune telling and supersti-
tion, against vagrancy and highway robbery.
Kunze further opposes the duke’s council of state and
the city government of Munich. Stating that "the ducal
council treated the city council more and more frequently
as an inferior authority,"239 KUnze describes the state
council's domination by the Catholic myth as the source of
this distinction between superior and inferior. Kunze's
depiction of the realm of criminal prosecution, as handled
by local government and by the state council, clarifies
this distinction.
According to Kunze, trials for criminals accused of
breaking the laws set forth by the duke and his council of
state were based on the Catholic myth's sanctions concern¬
ing the accumulation wealth and power. The trials, then,
represent a means of making a profit. Thus, Kunze notes
that "criminal proceedings [are carried out only when they
offer] some prospect of profit."240 Such a "prospect"
occurs only when criminal charges are made against "delin¬
quents who [own] property that might be confiscated."24^
This is the province of the state council; prosecution of
peasants and others who have no property is relegated to
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local authorities whose "judicial obligation . . . had to
be reckoned on the debit side ... an obligation to be
evaded wherever possible."^42
In this fashion, Kunze creates a Platonic framework in
which a transcendental rhetoric of oppositions reveals the
Catholic myth's domination, provides the supporting prem¬
ises for Kunze's proposition that a culture dominated by a
myth will manifest opposed feelings of hope and affirma¬
tion and fear and inadequacy through its adherents'
actions, and portrays Kunze's textual authority. As the
writer of the rules governing this framework, Kunze's
voice becomes that of the single philosopher in this
Bavarian world, a distinction which illustrates the chasm
that separates the Platonic realms of "Being" and "Becom¬
ing" and soul and body, as well as the gulf which sepa¬
rates the ethnographer and his informants. In addition,
when the reader remembers that these Bavarians, like
Plato's Critias and Timaeus, are the product of the con¬
trolling finger of the ethnographer, Kunze's portrayal of
his role as seventeenth-century Bavaria's recording secre¬
tary becomes the the portrait of the single guide capable
of leading the reader to the truth concerning the rela¬
tionship between cultures and dominant myths. Kunze the
ethnographer, like Plato, knows therefore what is to come
when he tells the tale of a family of peasants accused of
the crime of witchcraft within this framework of
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oppositions. As a result, Kunze’s wielding of the signi¬
fying finger on Derrida's postcard makes concrete the
notion of textual authority.
Telling the story of Paulus Pamb-Gamperl, his wife
Anna, and their three sons Gumprecht, Michel, and Hansel,
within the framework of oppositions provides Kunze with
the sense of emotional coherence needed to tie the "dark
cloud, drifting eastward with the wind across the blue sky
of a summer afternoon"with the "brewing storm" in
Kunze's Preface. In addition, the story actualizes
Kunze's syllogistically supported proposition, for this
peasant family's plight reveals both the extent of the
Catholic myth's domination of Bavaria and the Burkeian
cycle of affirmation and hope and fear and inadequacy that
derive from the myth’s domination. More importantly,
however, the the story's ability to tie coherently Kunze's
transcendental rhetoric of oppositions used to depict the
proposition empowers Kunze's authority.
Kunze begins the story of the Pamb-Gamperl family with
the occasion from which the charge of witchcraft that is
leveled against them develops:
In Worth, a small town between Regensburg and
Straubing ... a thief by the name of Geindl
[is] hanged in the summer of 1599. Before he
dies he . . . [makes] a statement to the effect
that the ’tinker lads' . . . abetted him in the
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murder of seven pregnant women. These tinker
lads, Michel and Gumpprecht, [are] the adult sons
of [Paulus Pamb-Gamperl ] . 244
Kunze's speculation on the series of events that occur
between the time Geindl makes his statement and the time
the Pamb-Gamperl family is arrested in a barn in Tetten-
wang, a small village two prefectures north of Munich
along the Danube River, underscores the oppositions Kunze
creates between local governments and the state council.
After hanging Geindl, the local authorities in Straubing
write "to their colleagues in Munich, asking them to mount
a search for those dangerous vagrants, the [Pamb-
Garaperls]."246 Somewhat later, Alexander von Hasling, the
former soldier turned prefect of Abensberg and Altmann-
stein, the prefecture in which Tettenwang lies, receives
the orders sent from Munich to the prefects along the
Danube concerning the Pamb-Gamperls, who "allegedly
[travel] about the Danube area . . . stealing from the
peasants and killing wayfarers."246 Hearing that the
family is staying the night in a barn in Tettenwang, von
Hasling has them arrested and reports the arrest to Mu¬
nich. Yet, Kunze notes, because the peasant family is
vagrant and thus has nothing of value to offset the costs
of a criminal trial, von Hasling, realizing that the
orders from Munich provide him with no other means of
ridding himself of these "vagrants" other than finding
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them guilty of murder and theft, begins to question them.
The questions, however, reveal only the difficulty of
disposing of the case satisfactorily because the family
denies having committed any crime.247 The economic and
political pressures stemming the opposition between the
local and State governments thus drive von Hasling to
begin a cycle of victiraage which ends only with the Pamb-
Gamperls becoming scapegoats for the feelings of fear and
inadequacy overwhelming Bavaria.
At this point, however, the peasant faultily is merely a
scapegoat for von Hasling's feelings of fear and inadequa¬
cy caused by the state's domination of him. Resorting
therefore to torture, a means of interrogation better
suited than simple questioning to lead "to answers . . .
calculated to support a judgment,"248 von Hasling gained
admissions of guilt for the crimes of murder, theft, and
witchcraft. Thus, Kunze reports that von Hasling sends a
"transcript [of his findings concerning the Pamb-Gamperls]
to the council of state in Munich. He may have had an
ulterior motive [,however], possibly seeing in the sugges¬
tive term witchcraft some hope of getting rid of this
expensive and troublesome case."249 The Pamb-Gamperl
family thus finds itself shackled in the cart approaching
the gates of Munich.
It is, however, during the trial in Munich that the
engine of Kunze's proposition concerning myth-dominated
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cultures in general and Bavaria in specific is truly
engaged. For it is through this trial that Kunze's tran¬
scendental rhetoric of oppositions reaches its zenith.
Through this rhetoric, the fear and inadequacy felt by the
Bavarians and created by the Catholic myth’s domination
over the Bavarian culture lead the reader to understand
fully Kunze's observation that the Pamb-Gamperl family’s
trial comes
full cycle [because] a host of unsolved crimes
and inexplicable disasters to cattle and crops
throughout Bavaria [leads] . . . the council of
state [to the idea] that the elusive perpetrators
[of these crimes and disasters] should be de¬
terred by a large-scale show trial, as soon as
some of them fell into the hands of the law. It
was then that news arrived of [the Pamb-
Gamperls].250
Kunze's portrayal of the trial allows him to provide
further support to his perception of the extent of the
Catholic's myth domination of seventeenth-century Bavaria
as well as the oppositions between the feelings of hope
and affirmation and fear and inadequacy generated by the
myth. The trial, therefore, additionally forms the back¬
ground for Kunze's depiction of the oppositions between
the Catholics and Lutherans and between the letter of law
and its application; these oppositions form the frames
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within which the Bavarians act. And it is through these
acts that the myth's domination and its engendered feel¬
ings are seen.
The extent of the Catholic myth’s domination of
seventeenth-century Bavaria is best seen in the characters
of Duke Maximilian and his forefathers and in the charac¬
ters of Johann Baptist Fickler, the court scribe, and
Johann Simon Wangereck, a member of the court of state and
chief prosecutor during the witchcraft trial. Kunze
describes Maximilian as
a man who had never been young. After seven
years in the care of nurses, he was surrounded by
an entourage in the Spanish style while still a
child, confined within the gloomy precincts of
the Old Palace and subjected to a strict regime
of tutors, preceptors, and confessors.25^
It was through this "regime" that Maximilian's father,
Duke William, hoped to "turn the skinny, pallid youth into
an ideal prince."252 By placing the young Maximilian in
an environment which paralleled the conditions William’s
father, the continuously drunk and economically indulgent
Duke Albrecht V, placed William in, William believed that
Maximilian would learn "a capacity for hard work and self-
control [that would] eradicate any trace of childish
imagination by means of regular religious exercises and an
unrelenting timetable of studies."253 As a result, both
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Maximilian and his father "sought refuge in a sentimental
kind of religiosity, finding a substitute for forbidden
childhood dreams in the officially approved mysticism of
the saints."254 The feelings of fear and inadequacy
generated by the Catholic myth, then, find roots in Maxi¬
milian's and William's perception of hell as their "predi¬
lection for the carefree pleasures of the senses."255
Kunze observes that the contradictory feelings created
by the Catholic myth led Albrecht to his one "fanatical
concern," the Catholic faith. More specifically, the
Burkeian cycle in which the feelings of hope and affirma¬
tion engendered by Catholicism's sense of order lead to
the feelings of guilt and inadequacy promoted by that same
sense of order drove Albrecht, following the religious
settlement of Augsburg, to "hunt down the members of other
faiths with a gusto that he otherwise evinced only in the
chase."255 This "gusto" is translated by both William and
Maximilian into their using these other faiths, particu¬
larly the Lutherans, as scapegoats through which the
entire cycle of feelings created by the Catholic myth
could be exercised.
For Johann Baptist Fickler, the former tutor to young
Maximilian and at the time of the witchcraft trial the
court scribe, "there [is] only one authority in questions
of morality, as in questions of law: the true religion
[Catholicism]. Anything approved by that religion could
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not be false, as far as he [is] concerned." The feel¬
ings of affirmation and hope which derive from Fickler's
perception the myth's orderly Truth further support his
own ambition for wealth and power. Kunze notes that
Fickler has "grandiose political plans"258 for himself, an
agenda which appears to him to be attainable by using the
Lutheran heretics as a means of ingratiating himself to
both William and Maximillian. He finds the occasion of
traveling to the "neighboring principality of
Pfalz-Neuburg" with young Maximilian particularly appropri¬
ate for inaugarating these plans, for Count Palatine
Philipp Ludwig, the ruler of Pfalz-Neuburg, is a Lutheran
who, Fickler tells William, "[has] sinister ulterior
motives"259 for inviting Maximilian to his notorious
Protestant principality. Kunze states that "Fickler's
insistent warnings [about the Lutherans help prevent the]
catastrophic consequences for the Catholic party [that
would have occurred] if [the count] . . . succeeded in
corrupting Maximilian."260
Finally, Johann Simon Wangereck, a member of Duke
Maximilian's council of state and chief prosecutor of the
Pamb-Gamperl witchcraft trial, "never heard from the
mouths of [his] father, [his] preacher, or [his] school¬
master anything other than the virulent condemnation of
the Lutheran heresy"261 when he was a child. Later, as a
student at the Jesuit college in Munich, this early
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antiLutheran conditioning merged with "the fanatical reli-
n go
gious faith propagated by the Jesuits." Following his
payment for his doctorate in criminal law from the Univer¬
sity of Ingolstadt, Wangereck joined Duke William’s coun¬
cil of state and became a member of the faction of the
council known as "learned, upright, and zealous
o c o
Catholics.By the time of the Pamb-Gamperl witchcraft
trial, therefore, Wangereck's "zealous" Catholicism and
his "virulent condemnation" of the Lutheran faith led his
interest in criminal law to the legal specialty of witch¬
craft. Kunze notes that Wangereck owns "a volume of
Martin Delrio's legal manual on witchcraft entitled Dis-
auisitiones Maaicarum. From this and other relevant
literature [Wangereck derives] the firm conviction that
witches and sorcerers should be prosecuted ruthlessly."264
Kunze's development of these characters thus reveals
the extent to which the Catholic myth dominates the men
closest to the witchcraft trial, which serves as the focal
point for Kunze's proposition concerning myth-dominated
cultures. Several of Kunze's observations concerning Duke
Maximilian and William, his father, further illuminate the
Catholic myth's domination of Bavaria and thus futher
empower his proposition. William's abdication of the
ducal throne in favor of Maximilian, Kunze observes, did
not allow William to find the sense of internal peace his
stepping down was supposed to provide. Although he
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continues to feed “twelve paupers at his table each day
and, like Jesus, even wash[es] their feet
occasionally . . . [and although] he chastis[es] himself
and mortifiefs] his flesh, and [spends] many hours each
day in prayer,"265 ^he feelings of affirmation and hope
William ascribes to "inner serenity" continue to elude
him. Kunze says William believes the "machinations of
sinister forces"266 lie behind his failure, for William
"had persecuted the heretics in his realm too zealously,
shown too little mercy in burning witches, served the
cause of Christ too plainly not to incur the bitter hatred
of the Devil on himself and his family."267
Further, Kunze sees the young Maximilian's membership
in the Munich Congregation of Mary, a Jesuit society
founded as the "response on the part of the Jesuits to
Protestant criticism of the adoration of the saints,"268
as the factor which prompts Maximilian's change from the
young prince, who believes in "moderation in all things,"
to the duke, who is "tormented with apocalyptic
fears . . . [stemming from Maximilian's belief that]
ultimately, when the time came, he would have to answer to
his Creator for every one of his subjects.269 The Congre¬
gation of Mary's education of the young Maximilian includ¬
ed the strong image of the prince as "a warrior in the
cause of Christ who had to lead heretics 'back into the
fold.'"270 As a result, Duke Maximilian comes to see "the
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shadows of the Thirty Years’ War . . . the Turks [stand¬
ing] no more than a few days' march from Vienna . . .
[and] the [pope's] alliance with the king of France
against the emperor"as symbols of "the war between the
kingdom of God and that of the Devil. "2*72 ^s a "warrior
of Christ," then, it is Maximilian's duty to follow his
father's direction and punish the "men [who] desert to the
forces of the Evil One . . . [through] draconian
punishment."AJ
Kunze points to the influence of Spain on Bavaria
during Maximilian's reign as the final arena in which the
Catholic myth’s domination may be seen. According to
Kunze,
the spirit of Spain pervaded all of Europe . . .
[to the extent that] Spanish taste governed
fashion, literature, warfare, diplomacy, manners,
and painting. The policy of restoration and
reaction that was pursued in Bavaria [thus] took
Spain as its model [in that] the public order
measures . . . were essentially Spanish: a system
of censorship, spying on subjects and officials,
denunciations, penalties for emigration, [and]
vicious persecution of heretics.
Moreover, Kunze depicts Spanish imperialism as a series of
"holy wars, hence bestial; an expression of God's will,
hence fiendishly cruel; sanctified, hence ruthless; noble,
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hence vile; honorable, hence predatory."275 These same
characteristics pervade the "wars" Pope Innocent III wages
against Christians of other denominations and thus the
development of the Inquisition as a tool for "locating and
identifying the adversary."276 The Inquisition, seen by
Kunze as an ecclesiastical model for Maximilian's secular
courts, therefore becomes the greatest symbol of the
Catholic myth's domination of Maximilian's Bavaria. More
importantly, the Inquisition functions as Kunze's means of
actualizing his proposition, for it merges secular and
ecclesiastical activities so that the myth's Burkeian
cycle of victimage can be applied to the Pamb-Gamperl
family's trial.
Kunze states that the sense of fear which drives the
inquisitorial Pamb-Gamperl trial comes directly from the
Catholic myth's abstract description of the "abyss" and
its believers discerning that description in a series of
signs that indicate that the myth's sense of order is
collapsing. The emperor and the pope are "losing their
aura of divinity . . . [indicating that] the ancient bonds
of a social, legal, and moral kind [are] breaking
down."* Reports of "people encounter[ing] death in
person . . . fiery signs in the night sky . . . comets
with tails that [sow] ruin . . . [and] skies [raining]
down serpents, blood, and repulsive vermin"278 reflect
God's anger and the Revelation of St. John. Moreover,
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these signs reawaken the Bavarians' "personification of
misfortune" which holds that "demons [stand] around the
sickbed, demons [guide] the woodsman's axe into his leg,
demons [slay] the newborn child, demons [grin] from every
corner, [lurk] behind every tree. [Demons strike] down
cattle in the meadow, and [cause] the river to burst its
banks."^79 church instruction shows the Bavarians that
the only means of combatting these evil hordes is through
the hopeful and affirmative actions of "prayer and self-
denial, [invoking] the saints, the sign of the cross, and
[sprinkling] holy water,"*6 w and, according to Maximilian
and his council of state, through the tracking down and
punishing fearsomely the inadequately few Satanic collabo¬
rators who are assisting the collapse of order. Maximil¬
ian thus demands that his council of state "accept his
father's definition of witchcraft . . . in a literal
OOI
sense."601 According to this definition,
anyone who practice[s] soothsaying or offer[s] to
find stolen property [is] liable to be suspected
of witchcraft. Anyone who inflict[s] disease on
men or beasts [is] accutely suspicious . . . but
suspicion . . . also [falls] on anyone who
cure[s] a patient whom doctors had failed to
restore to health. Witches [are] also capable of
conjuring up 'strange and spurious diabolical
apparitions and curious specters'; anyone who
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boast[s] of such exploits [is] likely to be
arrested. Anyone who call[s] on the Devil when
he [is] angry [is] highly suspicious, as [is]
anyone who wish[es] another person evil, if that
9 ft 9
person subsequently sufferfs] some misfortune.
Further, Maximilian adds, anyone who deviates "from the
true faith [is] prey to Satan [for] in the war between
saint and devil, no one could be neutral."283 Maximilian
thus reaffirms Augustine's perception of the world of men
as "beset by demons and spirits of darkness who [tempt and
seduce] them with evil lusts and favorable opportun¬
ities . ••284
In the case of the Parab-Gamperl family, a group whom
Johann Wangereck portrays in his reports to Maximillian as
vagrant, Lutheran "nobodies" suspected of the "particular¬
ly evil offenses" of murder, robbery, and, above all
witchcraft, "these grave and secret offenses" that are
incapable of detection and solution "by the usual methods
of proof"285 demand that the ordinary system of laws be
reinterpreted so that the family's guilt can be clearly
demonstrated. Through Wangereck's belief that "if . . .
the law [is] construed in the right spirit, then there
[is] no difficulty in complying with it,"288 the law
prohibiting arrested persons from being "prompted" to
answer questions in a particular way is reinterpreted on
the basis of another law which states "'in the case of
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particularly grave and heinous offenses . . . it is permis¬
sible to depart from customary procedural and legal prin-
ciples. • ' As a result, under the sanction of both
Catholic myth and secular law and through the direction of
Maximilian's council of state, Sebastian Georg, the warden
of the Falcon Tower prison in which the peasant family is
jailed, tortures the Pamb-Gamperls, obtains the confes¬
sions the council of state desires, and paves the way for
the public execution of the convicted witch and her family
of sorcerers. In addition, the acts of torture mandated
by the council of state provide an outlet for the Catholic
myth’s domination of Maximilian and his council of state,
for the contradictory feelings of hope and affirmation and
fear and inadequacy generated by the myth are expressed
through the torture and defeat of the representatives of
Satan and eased through the brutal suffering of the repre¬
sentatives of the challenges to theological and secular
order making their appearance at this time. Further, the
laws' reinterpretation by Wangereck puts into motion once
more the Burkeian cycle of victimage through which the
massed spectators of the Pamb-Gamperl family's execution
move as they temporarily affirm the hope the Catholic myth
offers by placing their feelings of fear and inadequacy in
a mangled and burned scapegoat. Finally, through the
trial and its result, Kunze's use of Plato's Timaeus's
method of syllogistically examining a series of posed
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oppositions in order that premises supporting a proposi¬
tion may be developed receives its final affirmation.
Most importantly, the Parab-Garaperl family's torture,
conviction, and execution highlights Kunze's position as
Plato’s textual artisan whose "harmonious" creation can
only be "undone" by evil, as Plato's philosopher whose
voice is the only voice capable of directing the reader to
Truth, and thus as the inheritor of Plato's notion of
textual authority.
A return to the questions posed at the beginning of
chapter two of this study of the relationship between
Platonic method and authority as revealed in the "Meno,"
the "Phaedo," and the "Timaeus," and the three major
genres of ethnography, which I have called the Realist,
Interpretive/Translative, and Fictive genres, reveals
several interesting answers to these questions. I asked
first what happens if the question ethnographers have
asked concerning the relationship between Platonism and
ethnography changes from "How does Platonism affect eth¬
nography?" to "How does Platonism create ethnography?"
More specifically, I asked what results from seeing Plato¬
nism not as a set of structural motifs which are present
in or which must be avoided by ethnographic texts but as
the source of ethnography itself. The answer to this
question must be addressed in three parts, for each of the
ethnographic genres addresses Platonic method and
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authority somewhat differently. As represented by Broni¬
slaw Malinowski's Sex and Repression in Savage Society.
Anthony F.C. Wallace's The Death and Rebirth of the Sene¬
ca . and Marjorie Esman's Henderson. Louisiana. the ethnog¬
raphers writing in the Realist genre rely on Plato's
distinction between the body and the soul as developed in
the "Meno" to separate the perspectives of the ethnogra¬
pher and the studied culture. Further, these ethnogra¬
phers rely on Plato's portrayal of the soul as the seat of
knowledge and the Platonic definition of the philosopher
as the sole individual capable of attaining and under¬
standing this knowledge as a means of displacing competing
depictions of the "reality'' of a culture, controlling the
directions of their monologues, and personifying the
abstract nature of authority. Moreover, the Realist
ethnographers embrace the method of causal reasoning Plato
uses to demonstrate the distinction between the body and
the soul, the soul as the seat of knowledge, and the
definition of the philosopher to use theory as a means of
manipulating the studied culture. Finally, these ethnog¬
raphers rely on Plato's use of writing to create textually
the diachronic flavor of time and history necessary for a
sense of Truth. As a result, Realist textual authority
may be characterized as the textually portrayed writer
whose discourse reflects the ideology of Plato’s method
and the personal domination of Plato's philosopher.
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The Interpretive/Translative ethnographers, represent¬
ed by Clifford Geertz's The Religion of Java, David M.
Schneider's American Kinship, and Vinigi L. Grottanelli's
The Python Killer, similarly accept Plato's continued
distinctions between the body and the soul as developed in
the "Phaedo" to separate the perspectives of the
ethnographer and the studied culture. Further, these
ethnographers rely on Plato's continued portrayal of the
soul as the seat of knowledge and the extended Platonic
definition of the philosopher as the sole individual
capable of attaining and understanding this knowledge as a
means of personifying the abstract nature of authority and
controlling the directions of their monologues. Avoiding
the geometrical form of causal reasoning embraced by the
writers in the Realist genre, the Interpretive/Translative
ethnographers embrace Plato's later use of rhetorically-
generated oppositions. When examined syllogistically,
these oppositions are employed by Plato in the "Phaedo" to
demonstrate the distinction between the body and the soul;
to depict the soul as the seat of knowledge; and to pro¬
vide the definition of the philosopher. The Interpretive/
Translative ethnographers similarly employ these opposi¬
tions as sources of symbol systems which create the prem¬
ises needed to lead to a proposition. This proposition,
in turn, functions as the focal point around which the
ethnographers' interpretation and translations develop and
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as the means of manipulating the studied culture. Final¬
ly, like the Realist ethnographers, the Interpretive/
Translative ethnographers accede to Plato’s use of writing
to create textually the diachronic flavor of time and
history necessary for a sense of Truth. As a result,
Interpretive/Translative textual authority may be
characterized in the same fashion as Realist textual
authority: it is the textually portrayed writer whose
discourse continues to reflect the ideology of Plato's
method and the personal domination of Plato’s philosopher.
The Fictive ethnographers—represented by Jane Kram¬
er’s The Last Cowboy. John McPhee’s Basin and Range, and
Michael Kunze’s Highroad to the Stake—like the Realist
and Interpretive/Translative ethnographers, rely on
Plato's continued distinction between the body and the
soul as it is developed in the "Timaeus" to separate the
perspectives of the ethnographer and the studied culture.
Further, like the Realist and Interpretive/Translative
ethnographers, the Fictive ethnographers depend on Plato's
portrayal of the soul as the seat of knowledge and the
Platonic definition of the philosopher as the sole indi¬
vidual capable of attaining and understanding this knowl¬
edge as a means of controlling the direction of their
monologues. Moreover, like the Interpretive/Translative
ethnographers, the writers of Fictive ethnographies employ
rhetorically-generated oppositions that, when examined
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syllogistically, develop premises needed to support a
proposition which, in turn, functions as the focal point
from which the ethnographer's theory may manipulate the
studied culture. But where the Interpretive/Translative
ethnographers use the oppositions as a means of propagat¬
ing symbol systems, the Fictive ethnographers use the
oppositions to recreate Plato’s metaphorical rhetoric of
transcendence as a means of actualizing their proposition
within a framework created by the telling of a tale char¬
acteristic of the studied culture. As a result, Fictive
textual authority may be characterized in the same fashion
as Interpretive/Translative and Realist textual authority:
it remains the textually portrayed writer whose discourse
reflects the ideology of Plato's method and the personal
domination of Plato's philosopher.
Despite the fact that a reader might argue that the
world created in Plato's "Timaeus" is the first ethnogra¬
phy in that its focus on a cultural myth shows how a
specific culture views the world around it, on the basis
of the analyses in chapters two through four, the first
question I posed at the beginning of chapter two must be
negatively answered. Plato's dialogues do not "create”
ethnography. The various ethnographic genres, however, do
appear to be reapplications of the Platonic dialogues, a
perspective which explains why Marcus and Cushman conclude
their study of ethnographies as texts by stating,
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"[Experimental ethnographies], however interesting the
historic conditions which gave rise to them, are refine¬
ments and represent an essentially involutionary period in
the twentieth century history of realism."400 Such a
perspective also echoes Kenneth Burke's observation on
Karl Mannheim's sociological study, Ideology and Utopia.
Burke notes that Mannheim’s book "grounds its analysis in
the study of chiliastic doctrines. ... We thus have
more the feel of an ultimate order [because the reader]
can discern here the elements, broken and reassembled, of
O QQ
a Platonic dialogue."410*
The second question I posed at the beginning of chap¬
ter two asks, "What happens to ethnographic textual au¬
thority if ethnography is viewed as a creation of Plato¬
nism?" If ethnography is not a creation of Platonism but
is, rather, a "reassembly" or a reapplication of Plato's
methods as developed in the "Meno," the "Phaedo," and the
"Timaeus," then the answer to the question concerning
textual authority is that it, too, is a reapplication of
Plato's notion of authority. It has, therefore, the same
dominative characteristics I have described above, for
textual authority in the ethnographic genres analyzed in
the preceding chapters appears to remain the textually
portrayed writer whose discourse reflects the ideology of
Plato's method and the personal domination of Plato's
philosopher.
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Marcus and Cushman's conclusion concerning the devel¬
opments resulting from ethnographers’ viewing ethnogra¬
phies as texts and Kenneth Burke's observation of Karl
Mannheim's text, besides echoing my conclusions, prompt
yet another question concerning ethnographic textual
authority: Is it possible to devise a new notion of
ethnographic textual authority that is not based on a
Platonic model? The final chapter in this study proposes
such a notion.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION: RHETORIC, SOPHISTIC, AND A
POSTPLATONIC VIEW OF ETHNOGRAPHIC TEXTUAL AUTHORITY
M
. . . in the genealogy of texts there is a first text, a
sacred prototype, a scripture, which readers always ap¬
proach through the text before them, either as petitioning
suppliants or as initiates amongst many in a sacred chorus
supporting the central patriarchal text."^
The early Greeks were aware of the nature of authority
and believed it to be an integral portion of the rhetori¬
cal situation. Plato, for example, in the Phaedrus states
that authority may only be obtained when the rhetor "has
the capacity to declare to himself with complete percep¬
tion, in the presence of another, that here is the man [my
italics] . . . [and] he must apply this kind of speech in
this sort of manner in order to obtain persuasion for this
kind of activity. . . ."^ A description of authority
mirroring Plato's occurs centuries later in David True-
blood's claim that "because sense experience is so open to
error ... we need to listen to those qualified to
o
know."J Both men--explicitly in the case of Plato, im¬
plicitly in the case of Trueblood—emphasize the relation¬
ships between authority and discourse, authority and
speaker, authority and audience, and authority and
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persuasion. Moreover, both men—once again explicitly in
the case of Plato, and implicitly in the case of True-
blood--reveal the nature of textual authority as it dis¬
tinguishes itself in ethnographic text. Plato's notion of
the writer's “complete perception" bases itself on a
dorainative rhetoric that displaces competing claims,
objectifies the subject of its concern through its appli¬
cation of theories, definitions, and examples, and hege-
monically represses voices of dissent through a monologue
disguised as dialogue. Jasper Neel describes the manipu¬
lative nature of this rhetoric, noting that there are
three rules of Platonic discourse: a "definition of
terras," which precludes competing definitions through the
definition's association with the single voice capable of
attaining knowledge; a "’knowledge of the truth,’" which
is mated with a textualized ideology useable only by that
single voice; and an "ability to divide and collect,"
which stems from that voice's distanced perspective.4 As
the previous chapters have indicated, this rhetoric of
Plato’s is the "patriarchal source" of ethnographic dis¬
course in the Realist, Interpretive/Translative, Represen¬
tative, and Fictive genres. Further, Plato’s concept of
the "another," whose presence is required for textual
authority to develop, refers directly to his hegemonic
finger's target, Socrates, and thus to the ethnographer
writing in these genres, the cultural object of the
375
ethnographer's inscribing finger, and to the resulting
expectations of readers of these ethnographies. Edward
Said describes these readers as "no longer simply [inter¬
ested in] 'understanding': now the [readers expect the]
Orient ... to perform, its power . . . enlisted on the
side of 'our' values, civilization, interests, goals."5
In addition, Plato’s resounding "here is the man" illus¬
trates the ethnographer writing in one of the genres as
the sole guide to truth in either the context of an exotic
"other" culture or as the author of another context in
which a culture is used to actualize other agendas and
illustrate the objectivized subject of the ethnographer's
discourse. Finally, Plato's decree concerning "this kind
of speech in this sort of manner ... to obtain persua¬
sion for this kind of activity" establishes the persuasive
nature of ethnographic discourse in these genres. For if
this ethnographic writing is to be recognized as ethno¬
graphic writing by a reading audience of ethnographers,
its discourse must contain some textual features permeated
by authority.
Nonetheless, neither Plato nor Trueblood nor Neel
answer some rather troublesome questions deriving from the
reliance on Plato's notion of textual authority. Are
these genres of ethnographic discourse either imbued with
a sense of authority or reflective of it? Can such texts
obtain or lose authority? What does a reader perceive
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that creates or reinforces the authority of these texts?
Finally, to what extent is the persuasive power of the
texts reliant upon textual authority?
Answers to these questions, although implied in the
preceding chapters’ analyses, are based on a definition of
textual authority that remains as yet unspecified. Aris¬
totle, for example, implies merely that authority is an
"antecedent impression,"8 an a-rhetorical concept.
George Kennedy asserts that authority is something "a
Homeric orator must have," one of the "basic modes of
proof of Judeo-Christian rhetoric,"8 and, according to
Augustine, a source of knowledge. Finally, Edward Cor¬
bett describes authority as a type of testimony useful in
arguments concerning "the conduct of human affairs."18 It
seems then that the general concept of textual authority,
as seen by some leading rhetoricians, is a quality exist¬
ing outside a rhetorical situation but necessary for the
acceptance of knowledge claims and representative of the
dominion of the Judeo-Christian God. Yet, this definition
blurs the distinction between coercion and persuasion, a
difference Leonard Krieger insists is crucial for "the
understanding of our own times and for the history of
political and social ideas.Jacques Derrida's percep¬
tion of textual authority as a "filial" relationship
reveals a similar diminishing of the difference between
coercion and persuasion. In describing the authority
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generated through the relationship between Plato and So¬
crates, Derrida paints a picture of manipulation and
deceit:
Plato’s dream: to make Socrates write, and to
make him write what he [Plato] wants, his last
command, his will. To make him write what he
wants by letting (lassen) him write what he
wants. Thereby becoming Socrates and his father,
therefore his own grandfather . . . and killing
him. He teaches him to write. He teaches him to
live.12
Similarly, Michel Foucault emphasizes the forceful nature
of authority's powers of exclusion, citing these powers as
the primary cause for the change in Greek perceptions of
discourse. Whereas for the sophists truth lay in what
discourse was, for Plato truth lay in what discourse said:
For . . . the sixth century Greek poets, true
discourse--in the meaningful sense—inspir[ed]
respect and terror, to which all were obliged to
submit, because it held sway over all and was
pronounced by men who spoke as of right, accord¬
ing to ritual, meted out justice and attributed
to each his rightful share; it prophesied the
future, not merely announcing what was going to
occur, but contributing to its actual event. . . .
And yet, a century later. . . . [a] division
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emerged between Hesiod and Plato . . . ; it was a
new division for, henceforth, true discourse was
no longer considered precious and desirable,
since it had ceased to be discourse linked to the
exercise of power.
In other words, the sophistic view of discourse as a holy
object wielded within a ritualized context was excluded
(Derrida's "killed") by Plato's view of discourse as the
means to truth wielded within contexts developed by it¬
self. As a result of this sophistic demise, textual
authority became a means of production; it became the
controlling, selecting, organizing, and redistributing
actions of the authors of truth; and it is seen in the
ethnographies analyzed in the previous chapters. Such a
definition of textual authority, however, creates a prob¬
lem, for by its very nature coercion denies rhetoric. As
a result, the changes in the textual choices made by
ethnographers writing in the these genres concerning the
cultural materials selected, the methods of arranging that
material, and the styles used to present the material will
not lead to a less dominative sense of textual authority.
Chapters two through four of this study show this to be
the case.
Is there, then, a means of reemphasizing the critical
difference between coercion and persuasion, of bridging
the gulf between sophistic and Platonic senses of
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discourse, of redefining textual authority so that ethnog¬
raphers writing in the Realist, Interpretive/Translative,
Representative, or Fictive genres may move away from the
problems inherent in their Platonic heritage? In short,
is there a means of understanding how textual authority
may function rhetorically?
Section I
Edward Corbett notes that "in an age characterized by
a scientific attitude and a democratic spirit, men are
temperamentally not as disposed as they once were to be
impressed and swayed by the voice of authority. . . . "^
Several hypotheses on the complexion of ethnographic
textual authority can be made from Corbett's observation.
First, ethnographic authority is somehow tied to the ethos
of a rhetor. George Kennedy traces such a connection,
stating that in pre-Socratic Greece an orator's authority
derived from what "he [had] done, [from] how he carriefd]
himself, [from] what sanctions he [brought] to support his
words."In a worldview focusing on neumena rather than
on an external "force," therefore, textual authority
becomes the capacity to evoke a voluntary submission to
acts and opinions--through such phenomena as degrees in
anthropology, familiarity with exotic culture, adherence
to accepted ethnographic methodology, and the ability to
write well--over and above the suasory force inherent in
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those acts and opinions themselves. Second, Corbett's
"scientific attitude" implies the existence of a single
certain basis for what ethnographers know. As Kenneth
Burke suggests, a simplistic dialectic underlies such a
view, resulting in the warrant that true knowledge can be
achieved only by pursuing the scientific method; all else
is primitive magic.In this world view, then, textual
authority becomes the capacity to evoke submission to acts
and opinions through the suasory force inherent in the
"truth" of those acts and opinions. Third, Corbett's men
who are indisposed to the "voice of authority" hint at the
possible existence of a Hobbesian world in which absolute
state power is the only barrier against a life that is
nasty, brutish, and short. In this world view, textual
authority becomes the capacity to evoke submission to acts
and opinions through political power.
Unfortunately, although these descriptions of ethno¬
graphic textual authority allow for other means of ap¬
proaching the question of what ethnographic textual au¬
thority is, they do nothing for the question of how textu¬
al authority functions rhetorically in ethnographies. A
simplistic response to this second inquiry might indicate
the possibility of different rhetorics, each developing
from the different definitions of authority. But a moment
of consideration would show how messy such a response
would be. The potential for using different appeals based
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on different definitions of authority would be contingent
upon the rhetor's ability to change the world view of an
audience. For example, Clifford Geertz describes reli¬
gious authority as residing in a culture's method of
conceiving the supernatural:
In tribal religions authority lies in the persua¬
sive power of traditional imagery; in mystical
ones in the apodictic force of supersensible
experience; in charismatic ones in the hypnotic
attraction of an extraordinary personality. '
Kenneth Burke presages Geertz's explanation of the source
of religious authority in his discussion of Christianity:
In the first chapter of Genesis, the stress is
upon the creative fiat as a means of classifica¬
tion. It says in effect, 'What hath God wrought
(by his word)?' The second chapter's revised
account of the Creation shifts the emphasis to
matters of dominion, saying in effect 'What hath
1 ft
God ordained (by his words)? ' ■LO
Plainly, religious authority seems to be supernatural in
origin and granted, either by a metaphorical association
with traditional images (e.g., in Christianity with images
of the cross, the fish, and so forth), by contact with
supersensible experience, or by accepting the Weberian
premise that charisma entails supernatural favor. Yet, a
rhetor could not effectively use the authority of
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traditional images in a worldview dominated by the authori¬
ty of the charismatic, nor could the rhetor use the au¬
thority of the direct contact with a supernatural force in
a world view controlled by the authority of the tradition¬
al images.
Moreover, the different-rhetorics-for-different-
conceptions-of-textual-authority model restricts authority
to personified or official residences, effectively pre¬
venting texts, rituals, types of explanation, justifica¬
tions, reasons, or particular real or ideal social ar¬
rangements from taking on authoritative dispositions.
Wayne Booth observes that human beings "justify [critical
claims for authority] only when they manage to get them-
selves embodied in a text.” ■L* Grant Webster magnifies
Booth's statement in his discussion of the varied authori¬
tative characteristics of the literary "charter." Accord¬
ing to Webster, such a document entails four different
authoritative features: a social grant "from an authority,
a sovereign which parallels critics' general acceptance of
theoretical authority"; a "licensing authority under which
organizations are set up and activities carried out"; an
intellectual authority "under which a critical school or
community defines and organizes itself"; and a temporal
authority which "is a grant of authority to pursue a
specified and otherwise forbidden activity within a spe¬
cific historical context that is limited spatially and
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socially." Such a text, in which rituals, types of
explanations, justifications, reasons, or particular real
or ideal social arrangements would be described, would
have no authoritative place in the model described above.
Instead, the model would become an after-the-fact means of
describing structural elements of textual authority per¬
ceived within the text. Finally, the model fails to
consider problems of decision making. Richard Rorty notes
that "there is nothing to be said about either truth or
rationality apart from descriptions of the familiar proce¬
dures of justification which a given society uses in one
or another area."41 In other words, decisions on knowl¬
edge claims are made from the basis of how a given society
justifies that decision. The different-rhetorics-for-
different-conceptions-of-textual-authority model and world
view, however, provides no way of describing these means
of justification, for these perceptions of textual author¬
ity, as described by the model, exist outside of any
discourse developed by the model.
Ethnographic textual authority, therefore, remains
unexplainable rhetorically. The previous method of at¬
tempting to show how a definition of textual authority
leads to a perception of authority as rhetoric creates the
problem. What would happen if the method was reversed so
that a definition of rhetoric provides a means of
perceiving ethnographic textual authority as rhetoric?
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Section II
For the sophists of the fifth century B.C., the con¬
cept of rhetoric, although not codified, was an important
one. It was through language that reality was made appre¬
hensible by means of the relationships between the names
of things, the structures of language, and the structures
of the things. According to G. B. Kerferd, the rhetorical
aspect of this notion of language and reality is found in
"setting two names against each other in order to abstract
from them the basic sense which they share and to ascer¬
tain those subtleties of meaning in which they differ.
[The sophists, in other words, were] asking not 'what is
x?', but 'in what respect is x different from y?'"22
Aristotle's description of rhetoric as the "faculty
[power] of discovering in the particular case what are the
available means of persuasion"^"* and Ernesto Grassi's
definition of rhetoric as "indicative [discourse] . . .
which [forms] the basis of . . . rational thought,"24 when
added to the context of the sophists' perspective, provide
a useful starting point in addressing the relationship
between ethnographic textual authority and rhetoric.
These descriptions illuminate the inherent problem with
which all three contend: How does one gain the confidence
and support of readers who possess the power of
judgment? The sophists found their solution in discerning
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the relationship between words and "what is the case [not
as] . . . simply a presentation in words [but as] . . .a
representation, involving a considerable degree of reor¬
ganisation in the process."26 in other words, rhetoric
becomes a means of using logos to operate on opinion in
order to appeal to knowledge. Similarly, Aristotle's
solution lies in the relationship between words and opin¬
ions, an association described in his functions of rheto¬
ric. According to Lane Cooper, these uses are the preven¬
tion of the "triumph of fraud and injustice . . . in¬
struct [ion] when scientific instruction is of no
avail . . . argument[ation in order to deal with] both
sides of a case . . . [and] defen[se through] reason."26
Finally, Grassi finds his solution in his distinction
between knowledge and opinion. Grassi observes that
in the rational process we claim that we know
something when we are able to prove it. To
prove . . . means to show something to be some¬
thing, on the basis of something. It is clear
that the first archai of any proof and hence of
knowledge cannot be proved themselves because
they cannot be the object of apodictic, demon¬
strative, logical speech [writing]. The rational
process and consequently rational speech must
move from the formulation of primary assertions:
by using the kind of expression which belongs to
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the nondeducible. . . . '
The combination of these solutions portrays rhetoric as a
means of inducing decisions and judgments, moving from the
relevant facts to some action or disposition regarding
those facts.
A successful application of rhetoric, then, supposes
the following: (1) a definition of textual authority of a
sort that can support and justify action; (2) a definition
of textual authority that is not simply the right of actor
A to get actor B to carry out A's will voluntarily; and
(3) a definition of textual authority which centers itself
on actor B's discovery of compelling properties of A when
A is a person, a solution to a puzzle, or any alternative
in a choice situation. In other words, textual authority
is an individual's attraction to the state of affairs
offered by an alternative and voluntary choice of that
option over others, a radically different perspective than
seeing textual authority as either being granted by an
outside "force" or somehow residing in a person, office,
text, ritual, explanation, justification, reason, or
social arrangement.
This view of textual authority as rhetoric further
bases itself on the sophistic belief that rather than
privileging the truth, a view of rhetoric held by Plato,
rhetoric makes its claims come true. It urges judgment in
a choice situation, judgment stemming from the manner in
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which a person's ethos causes him or her to see an alterna¬
tive's resources as attractive, judgment which makes
textual authority rhetorical. According to Kerford, judg¬
ment as rhetoric for the sophists is based on the concepts
of probability and timeliness: "When we put together the
doctrines of the Probable or Plausible and the Right
moment in Time, in relation to Opinion (or what men think
or believe), it is clear that we have . . . the elements
of a theory of rhetoric."'60 Moreover, the notion of
judgment implies a conception of choice. As Grant Webster
notes, "at the basis of the creative theorizing which lies
behind all normal critical practice, is the element of
p q
human choice."6’* Some description of an alternative's
possible resources, however, is necessary in order to
understand how those resources allow that alternative to
be chosen in a judgmental situation.
Alternatives may possess two types of resources that
make an individual more likely to chose them. The first
of these is the alternative's salience. A salient alter¬
native is more likely to be chosen because the perceiver's
expectations converge on it. But for that choice to be
made, a context must surround the choice, thereby allowing
an alternative's perceptibility to be noticed. Thomas
Kuhn's description of the "gestalt shift" explains this
context. According to Kuhn, "at times of revolution, when
the normal scientific tradition changes, the scientist's
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perception of his environment must be re-educated--in some
familiar situations he must learn to see a new gestalt.
In other words, a situation in which an individual must
make a judgment on competing knowledge claims demands a
context in which only a new way of seeing those claims can
allow perceptibility to develop. Thus, for Cicero, the
situation of a rhetor attempting to make a judge receptive
to a claim requires the creation of a "new gestalt" which
would allow the judge to apprehend the salience of the
rhetor's claim and grant it authority. This is the basis
of the De Oratore in which Cicero characterizes the offi-
cia oratoris as dependent, in a large fashion, on the
ability to "win over those who are listening [reading,
judging]."
The nature of salience, however, requires more specif¬
ic investigation than simply an example based on the
Ciceronian rhetorical system, for different attributes of
an ethnographic knowledge claim could be used as focal
points of a potentially authoritative alternative in an
ethnography. For example, George Gmelch, in his study of
baseball magic, claims that because the acts of pitching
and batting in professional baseball involve the greatest
degree of chance, they are therefore the greatest "arenas"
for observations of magical rituals, taboos, and
fetishes.^2 This claim gains its authority through the
attribute of precedence because its audience of
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ethnographers recognize as salient the precedence estab¬
lished forty-three years earlier by Bronislaw Malinowski's
statement that "we find magic wherever the elements of
chance and accident, and the emotional play between hope
and fear, have a wide and extensive range."33
Similarly, symmetry can function as an attribute of
the salience of a system of ethnographic knowledge claims,
for the symmetrical system will acquire more authoritative
force than will the asymmetrical system. Isocrates's
rhetorical system, as detailed in Against the Sophists,
emphasizes symmetry as a means of audience attraction
within the situation created by the competition for stu¬
dents among the schools of sophistic rhetoric in pre-
Socratic Greece. The triadic structure of nature, train¬
ing, and practice, when contrasted with the "listings" of
tricks of argumentation offered by other sophistic
schools, attracts a greater authoritative force.34
An analogous example is seen in the situation created
by the competing knowledge claims offered by ethnographic
functionalists and evolutionists. Malinowski's translated
relationship between etic and emic data promised a more
highly symmetrical and therefore authoritative system of
claims when contrasted with systems offered by such
evolutionists as Sir James Frazier.35
Finally, an ethnographic knowledge claim's prominence,
when viewed from the perspective of a particular critical
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backdrop, promotes that claim's potential textual authori¬
ty. Stephen R. Yarbrough observes that claims reflecting
Marxist desires to supersede capitalism will attract the
authority offered by the Marxist audience, and the same
holds for deconstructionist claims attempting to replace
•a £
structuralist claims. ° In the same manner, Melford
Spiro's claim that an unusually strong Oedipal complex
exists in the Trobriand Islands contends with Malinowski's
claim that the matrilineal society of the Trobriand Is-
■a 7
lands produces a complex very different from Freud’s.
When viewed from the perspective of the psychoanalytic
society, however, Spiro's claim’s attributes include
prominence, and therefore textual authority, for Spiro's
Freudian-oriented audience expects a Freudian construct.
Characteristics of salience, therefore, attract an
ethnography's reader's attention and direct the choices
made between competing knowledge claims. More important¬
ly, the act of choosing confers on the selected claim the
notion of textual authority.
Persuasive justifications work in a similar fashion,
for an ethnographic knowledge claim's support forms an
attribute which increases the claim's potential for at¬
tracting a reader's notion of textual authority.
Justifiable claims are more likely to be chosen than
claims lacking or having weaker substantiation. Moreover,
choosing a justified alternative depends on a Kuhnian
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"gestalt" which allows the reader to see the force of the
justifications and to therefore deem them authoritative.
Clifford Geertz, for example, claims that religion, be¬
sides providing “harmonizing, integrating, and psychologi¬
cally supportive aspects, [also promotes] disruptive,
•3 O
disintegrative, and psychologically disturbing aspects."
In order for his support to be recognized as an attribute
affecting potential authority, a Kuhnian "gestalt" in the
form of Ethnographic Idealism must function as a means of
allowing Geertz's justifications to be used as attributes
for an ethnographic knowledge claim having greater attrac¬
tiveness than Emile Durkheim's or Bronislaw
Malinowski's. *
Wayne Booth’s statement that the argument itself
indicates "whether further attention is 'due,' and . . .
finally tells us how we should judge what we find"^®
implies both the idea that justification is an attribute
used to attract textual authority and the idea that justi¬
fication has a describable nature. Returning to Geertz's
discourse on the effects of social change on religious
ritual illuminates this nature, for within the text Geertz
uses justification to create attributes of reliability,
universality, and constraint for his claims.
Justifications acquire reliability when they reveal
immunity to the pressures of temporary circumstances.
Thus, by defining culture as "the fabric of meaning in
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terms of which human beings interpret their experience and
guide their action,"41 Geertz includes within his defini¬
tion the functionalist emphasis on observable acts
("guided action") while at the same time removing the
pressure created by functionalism's tendency to treat
ethnographic data as static. Interpreting experience by
means of a "fabric of meaning" emphasizes the shifting
nature of meanings and their resultant interpretations.
Not being sealed within the strictures of a particular
situation, the definition of culture creates the sense of
reliability and adds to the potential textual authority of
Geertz's claim about religion.
Support for an ethnographic knowledge claim may also
command the attribute of universality and thus direct a
reader's attention and choice when it is easily trans¬
ferred across different social contexts. Ethnographers
have long demanded that etic analyses of cultures be
cross-culturally applicable. One result of this demand
has been the formation of the Human Relations Area Files,
a collection of information organized under eighty-eight
categories that are heavily cross-referenced.4^ The
authority granted by cultural researchers to these files
of data is created by the categories' ability to provide
guidance in a wide variety of social circumstances. Clif¬
ford Geertz similarly makes use of universal justification
by demonstrating that while Javanese religious beliefs
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effectively counteract the "centrifugal forces of fear,
dismay, [and] demoralization . . . [they also act] against
the grain of social equilibrium,"43 a paradox common, for
example, in European and American societies. Thus,
Geertz's support for his claim that Durkheimian and Mali-
nowskian functionalist perspectives lack explanatory
power, specifically in describing etically the nature of
religion, acquires the attribute of universality and, as a
result, textual authority.
Finally, justifications which demonstrate an ethno¬
graphic knowledge claim's ability to reduce arbitrariness
are more likely to be chosen as persuasive by a reader
than those that do not. For example, support for a knowl¬
edge claim that appeals only to narrow self-interest is
purely whimsical and therefore cannot contribute to the
claimant’s attempt to gain authority. This capricious
type of support is the target of Horace Miner's "Body
Ritual Among the Nacirema." In his essay, Miner describes
the process of medical prescription and the manner in
which medicine is obtained by the patient:
These preparations are secured from a variety of
specialized practitioners. The most powerful of
these are the medicine men, whose assistance must
be rewarded with substantial gifts. However, the
medicine men do not provide the curative potions
for their clients, but decide what the
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ingredients should be and then write them down in
an ancient and secret language. This writing is
understood only by the medicine men and by the
herbalists who, for another gift, provide the
required charms.44
Although Miner's description appears to be similar to the
justification Geertz supplies for his claim that religious
behaviors provide the Javanese with both socially cohesive
and socially destructive aspects, Miner intentionally in¬
vokes a caricature of etic interpretation. This dehuman¬
ized form is characteristic of merely one feature of
ethnography, and its emphasis creates an idiosyncratic
nature which does nothing to diminish arbitrariness.
Geertz, however, by including within his discourse a
description of the religious, political, and economic
setting of the Javanese village and an emic narration of
the funeral proceedings, avoids accusations of narrow
self-interest, downgrades the power of opposing (arbi¬
trary) knowledge claims, increases the attractiveness of
Geertz's thesis, and augments the potential for textual
authority.
Moreover, unless justifications suggest standards
against which future justifications can be judged, a sense
of arbitrariness remains, something which prevents the
ethnographic knowledge claim from attaining textual au¬
thority. Thus, in the section labeled "Analysis" of his
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treatment of Javanese religion, Geertz makes use of an
unexpressed heuristic both as an ordering mechanism and as
a means of testing future knowledge claims on cultural and
societal effects of religion. Kenneth Burke's notion of
logological analysis provides a workable means of examin¬
ing Geertz's methodology. "What opposes what?" provides a
structural framework for detailing the questions pertinent
to the schemata created by Durkheim's and Malinowski's and
Geertz's hypotheses on religion and its effects on culture
and society. For Durkheim, the questions may be consoli¬
dated and phrased in this manner: How does religion
"select the positive creed, the comforting view, the
culturally valuable belief in immortality?"45 For Mali¬
nowski, the questions may be consolidated and phrased in
this manner: How does religion give "body and form to the
saving beliefs [just as it does] with regard to the whole
group?"46
On the other hand, the questions for Geertz may be
consolidated and phrased in this manner: How does religion
represent the "independent roles [of] both culture and
social structure?"47 The arranging power of the first
Burkean query depicts Geertz's strategy of juxtaposing the
schemata in order to show the "difficult problems" which
develop from the application of Durkheim's and Malinow¬
ski's hypotheses to the Javanese example: neither can
explain fully the fact that "the ritual [was] tearing the
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society apart rather than integrating it, [was] disorgan-
4 ft
izing personalities rather than healing them."
Moreover, these "problems" not only cast doubt on future
credible employment of Durkheim’s and Malinowski's beliefs
but also return the reader to the heuristical question
which, in turn, forms the means for judging ethnographic
knowledge claims on the function of religion: How does the
claim and its support explain the relationship between
religion and the "discontinuity between the form of inte¬
gration existing in the social structural dimension and
the form of integration existing in the cultural dimen¬
sion?"4^
"What derives from what?" follows naturally from the
earlier portion of the heuristic, for Geertz's ensuing
discourse traces a protrait of a Javanese village seen
from this stance:
Amid a radically more complex social environment,
[the Javanese villager] clings noticeably to the
symbols which guided him or his parents through
life in rural society. And it is this fact which
gave rise to the psychological and social tension
surrounding [the religious function of the]
funeral.50
In addition, "What follows what?" provides a third means
of testing future ethnographic knowledge claims: How does
the claim and its support predict what will be observed in
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other societies where religious rituals "remind people
that the neighborhood bonds they are strengthening through
a dramatic enactment are no longer the bonds which most
emphatically hold them together?"51
The justifiability of an ethnographic knowledge claim
serving as an alternative to a competing knowledge claim
rests on an appeal to the reason of a reader. Alexander
McKelway notes this relationship, as well as the relation¬
ship between reason and textual authority, saying textual
authority "represents a legitimate aspect of reason. . . .
It tries to speak in the name of being and reason, and
c o
therefore speaks in an unconditional and ultimate way."^
More importantly, McKelway characterizes the nature of a
reader who, through his or her choice of an ethnographic
knowledge claim in competition with another, grant textual
authority--this is a reader verbally active within the
ethnographic field in which claims are offered as alterna¬
tives to previously existing claims, a reader clearly
perceiving him or herself as a "being" with the power to
grant textual authority. This is the reader portrayed by
Michael Overington when he states, "The practice of scien¬
tific inquiry depends ... on the acquiescence of indi¬
vidual scientists in the consensual agreement on norms,
standards, rhetoric, problems, solutions, judgments, and
the like, which provide for the continuing recreation of a
scientific consensus out of the skepticism of research."53
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Seeing textual authority as an important part of the
rhetorical operations of such a reader provides a means of
examining the process by which competing ethnographic
knowledge claims either fall by the wayside or develop
into Kuhnian paradigms which, in turn, give rise to new
claims. Further, seeing textual authority in such a light
permits answers to the questions posed earlier in this
chapter. First, ethnographic discourse is neither imbued
with nor reflective of a sense of textual authority since
textual authority is a reader-centered quality by means of
which competing ethnographic knowledge claims are differ¬
entiated so that one may be chosen on the basis of its
attributes of salience and justifiability. Second, an
ethnographer can neither lose nor gain textual authority
since textual authority does not reside in him or her, nor
in the claims and support making up the text. Rather, the
claims are perceived as textually authoritative by a
reader who has chosen these claims over others in the con¬
text of a continually recreating field of inquiry. Third,
persuasion, through the ethnographer's development of the
attributes of salience and justifiability, is used to
motivate a reader's choice of a particular knowledge claim
and thus view that claim as textually authoritative. This
system involving ethnographer and reader, however, is not
necessarily closed; alternative knowledge claims may, by
means of more highly attractive attributes, be seen as
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being more authoritative than previous claims, resulting in
increasing acts of inquiry and eventually constructions of
paradigms. One possible method of making these alterna¬
tive claims conspicuous and stimulating inquiry might be
through ethnographic use of Derrida's notion of the
“narrative allegory.By dramatizing or enacting the
truth inherent in the cultural events observed, perhaps
through visual media such as film, computer applications
such as Hypertext, or through text such as William Faulk¬
ner's Sound and the Fury in which multiple perspectives of
an event are balanced against each other, the material of
the signifiers might be favored over the meanings of the
signifieds. In this fashion, the view of readers as
rational actors, who make choices of knowledge claims on
the basis of attributes of salience and justifiability in
the context of a continually recreated field of inquiry
and through those choices grant authority, might be empha¬
sized. In addition, other stories beyond those sanctioned
by “official" ethnography might be told.
400
Notes
* Edward W. Said, The World, the Text, and the
Critic (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1983) 46.
^ Plato, Phaedrus, trans. W. C. Helmbold and
W. G. Rabinowitz (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril Educational
Publishing, 1985) 272.
o
David Trueblood, Philosophy of Religion
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1957) 67.
*
Jasper Neel, Plato, Derrida, and Writing
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1988) 52.
^ Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1978) 238.
® Aristotle, The Rhetoric of Aristotle, trans.
Lane Cooper (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1932) 9.
7
George Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and Its
Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern
Times (Chapel Hill: The U of North Carolina P, 1980) 10.
® Kennedy 122.
q* Kennedy 151.
Edward P.J. Corbett, Classical Rhetoric for the
Modern Student, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford UP, 1971) 138.
** Leonard Krieger, "The Idea of Authority in the
West," American Historical Review 82 (1977): 250.
1 7*
Jacques Derrida, The Post Card: From Socrates
to Freud and Beyond, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: U of
Chicago P, 1987) 52.
401
1
Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge
and the Discourse on Language, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith
(New York: Harper and Row, 1972) 218.
14 Corbett 137.
15 Kennedy 10.
^ Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives
(Berkeley: U of California P, 1969) 40-42.
1 7
Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures
(New York: Basic Books, 1973) 110.
1 8
Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion (Berkeley:
The U of California P, 1970) 203.
1 Q
Wayne C. Booth, Critical Understanding: The Powers
and Limits of Pluralism (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1979)
224.
2® Grant Webster, The Republic of Letters: A History
of Postwar American Literary Opinion (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins UP, 1979) 10.
o 1A Richard Rorty, "Science as Solidarity," The
Rhetoric of the Human Sciences: Language and Argument in
Scholarship and Public Affairs, eds. John S. Nelson,
Allan Megill, and Donald N. McCloskey (Madison: The U of
Wisconsin P, 1987) 42.
22 g. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1981) 74.
23 Aristotle 7.
24 Ernesto Grassi, Rhetoric as Philosophy (University
Park: The Pennsylvania State UP, 1980) 65.
402
25 Kerferd 78.
2^ Aristotle 5-6.
27 Grassi 64-65.
2® Kerferd 82.
2^ Webster 12.
Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions. 2nd ed. (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1970) 12.
Kennedy 100.
^2 George J. Gmelch, "Baseball Magic," Transaction
8 (1971): 39.
^ Bronislaw Malinowski, Coral Gardens and Their
Maaic (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1935) 10.
Kennedy 32.
^ See Sir James Frazier, The Golden Bough: A Study in
Magic and Religion (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955).
^ Stephen R. Yarbrough, "Differance, Deference, and
the Question of Proper Reading," Man and World 20 (1987):
280.
^7 Melford E. Spiro, Oedipus in the Trobriands
(Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1982) 1-11.
Geertz 143.
See Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the
Religious Life (New York: The Free Press, 1947) and
Bronislaw Malinowski, Magic. Science and Religion. and
Other Essays (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948).
40 Booth 225.
41 Geertz 145.
403
4^ see George P. Murdock, Outline of Cultural
Materialism (New Haven: HRAF, 1961).
43 Geertz 163, 168.
44 Horace Miner, "Body Ritual Among the Nacirema,"
American Anthropologist 58 (1956): 504.
45 Geertz 163.
46 Geertz 163.
47 Geertz 163.
4® Geertz 163.
4^ Geertz 164.
Geertz 165.
Geertz 169.
Alexander J. McKelway, The Systematic Theology
of Paul Tillich (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1965) 76.
c o
Michael A. Overington, "The Scientific Community
as Audience: Toward a Rhetorical Analysis of Science,"
Philosophy and Rhetoric 10 (Summer 1977): 145-46.
^4 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans.
Alan Bass, (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1978) 296.
404
Bibliography
Alverson, Hoyt. Mind in the Heart of Darkness: Value and
Self-Identitv Among the Tswana of Southern Africa.
New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1978.
Bakhtin, M. "Discourse in the Novel." The Dialogic
Imagination; Four Essays bv M.M. Bakhtin. Trans. Caryl
Emerson. Ed. Michael Holquist. Austin: The U of
Texas P, 1981. 259-442.
Bloom, Harold. The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of
Poetry. University Park: The Pennsylvania UP, 1980.
Booth, Wayne. The Rhetoric of Fiction. Chicago:
U of Chicago P, 1961.
Critical Understanding: The Powers and Limits of
Pluralism. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1979.
Breslow, Stephen P. "Trinidadian Heteroglossia: A
Bakhtinian View of Derek Walcott's Play A Branch of
the Blue Nile." World Literature Today 63.1 (1989):
36-39.
Briggs, Jean L. Never in Anger: Portrait of an Eskimo
Family. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1970.
Brockriede, Wayne. "Where is Argument?" Journal of the
American Forensic Association 11 (1975): 179-82.
Bruner, Edward. "Ethnography as Narrative." The Anthro¬
pology of Experience. Eds. Victor W. Turner and
Edward Bruner. Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1986. 139-
55.
405
Burke, Kenneth. Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on
Life, Literature, and Method. Berkeley: U of
California P, 1966.
A Rhetoric of Motives. Berkeley: U of California P,
1969.
The Rhetoric of Religion. Berkeley: U of
California P, 1970.
On Symbols and Society. Ed. Joseph R. Gusfield.
Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1989.
Cannon, Garland. Historical Change and English Word
Formation: Recent Vocabulary. New York: Peter Lang,
1987.
Chernoff, John M. African Rhythm and African Sensi¬
bility: Aesthetics and Social Action in African
Musical Idioms. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1979.
Clifford, James. "Fieldwork, Reciprocity, and the
Making of Ethnographic Texts: The Example of Maurice
Leenhardt." Man 15 (1980): 518-32.
"On Ethnographic Authority." Representations 1.2
(1983): 118-46.
"Introduction: Partial Truths." Writing Culture:
The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography. Eds. James
Clifford and George E. Marcus. Berkeley: U of
California P, 1986. 98-121.
"On Ethnographic Allegory." Writing Culture: The
Poetics and Politics of Ethnography. Eds. James
406
Clifford and George E. Marcus. Berkeley: U of
Calfornia P, 1986. 98-121.
Cooper, Lane, trans. and ed. The Rhetoric of Aristotle.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1932.
Corbett, Edward P. J. Classical Rhetoric for the Modern
Student. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford UP, 1971.
Crapanzano, Victor. "On the Writing of Ethnography."
Dialectical Anthropology 2.1 (1977): 69-73.
"The Life History in Anthropological Field
Work." Anthropology and Humanism Quarterly 2 (1977):
3-7.
Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan. Chicago: U of
Chicago P, 1980.
"Hermes' Dilemma: The Masking of Subversion in
Ethnographic Description." Writing Culture: The
Poetics and Politics of Ethnography. Eds. James
Clifford and George E. Marcus. Berkeley: U of
California P, 1986. 51-76.
Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatoloov. Trans. Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP,
1974.
Writing and Difference. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago:
U of Chicago P, 1978.
Positions. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: U of
Chicago P, 1981.
"Des Tours de Babel." Difference in Translation.
407
Trans. Joseph F. Graham. Ed. Joseph F. Graham.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1985. 218-35.
The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond.
Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987.
Dumont, Jean-Paul. The Headman and I. Austin: U of
Texas P, 1978.
Durkheim, Emile. The Elementary Forms of the Religious
Life. New York: The Free Press, 1947.
Dwyer, Kevin. "The Dialogic of Ethnology." Dialectical
Anthropology 4 (1979): 205-24.
"Dialogue of Fieldwork." Dialectical Anthro¬
pology 2 (1987): 199-218.
Esman, Marjorie R. Henderson. Louisiana: Cultural
Adaptation in a Caiun Community. New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1985.
Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology of Knowledge and the
Discourse on Language. Trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith.
New York: Harper and Row, 1972.
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other
Writings 1972-1977. Trans. Colin Gordon, Leo
Marshall, John Mepham, Kate Soper. Ed. Colin Gordon.
New York: Pantheon, 1980.
Frazier, Sir James. The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic
and Religion. New York: St. Martin's, 1955.
Freeman, Derek. Margaret Mead and Samoa: The Making and
Unmaking of an Anthropological Myth. New York:
408
Viking Penguin, 1984.
Geertz, Clifford. The Religion of Java. Chicago: U of
Chicago P, 1960.
The Interpretation of Culture. New York: Basic
Books, 1973.
“Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight."
Daedalus 101.1 (1975): 1-37.
"Blurred Genres." American
Scholar 49 (1980): 165-79.
"Making Experience, Authoring Selves." The
Anthropology of Experience. Eds. Victor W. Turner and
Edward W. Bruner. Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1986.
373-380.
Gmelch, George J. "Baseball Magic." Transaction 8
(1971): 39-41.
Grassi, Ernesto. "Marxism, Humanism, and the Problem of
Imagination in Vico’s Works." Giambattista Vico * s
Science of Humanity. Eds. Georgio Tagliacozzo and
Donald Verene. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976.
275-94.
Rhetoric as Philosophy: The Humanist Tradition.
University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1980.
Gregor, Thomas. Mehinaku: The Drama of Daily Life in a
Brazilian Indian Village. Chicago: U of Chicago P,
1977.
Grottanelli, Vinigi L. The Python Killer: Stories of
409
Nzema Life. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1988.
Gulley, Norman. Plato's Theory of Knowledge.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1962.
Gusfield, Joseph. Introduction. On Symbols and Society.
By Kenneth Burke. Ed. Joseph R. Gusfield. Chicago:
U of Chicago P, 1989.
Habermas, Jurgen. Knowledge and Human Interests. Trans.
Jeremy J. Shapiro. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1971.
Theory and Practice. Trans. John
Viertel. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1973.
Kennedy, George. Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian
and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times.
Chapel Hill, NC: The U of North Carolina P, 1980.
Kerferd, G. B. The Sophistic Movement. New York:
Cambridge UP, 1981.
Kramer, Jane. The Last Cowboy. New York: Harper and
Row, 1978.
Krieger, Leonard. "The Idea of Authority in the West."
American Historical Review 82 (1977): 237-64.
Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
2nd ed. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1970.
Kunze, Michael. Highroad to the Stake: A Tale of
Witchcraft. Trans. William E. Yuill. Chicago:
U of Chicago P, 1987.
Levi-Strauss, Claude. Totemism. Boston, MA: Beacon
Press, 1963.
. The Savage Mind. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1966.
McKelway, Alexander J. The Systematic Theology of Paul
Tillich. Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1965.
410
McPhee, John. Basin and Range. New York: Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 1981.
Malinowski, Bronislaw. Sex and Repression in Savage
Society. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1927.
Coral Gardens and Their Magic. London: George
Allen and Unwin, 1935.
Magic, Science and Religion, and Other Essays.
Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1948.
Marcus, George E. "Rhetoric and the Ethnographic Genre in
Anthropological Research." A Crack in the Mirror:
Reflexive Perspectives in Anthropology. Ed. Jay Ruby.
Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1982. 163-71.
Marcus, George E. and Dick Cushman. "Ethnographies as
Texts." Annual Review of Anthropology 11 (1982):
25-69.
Marcus, George E. and Michael M. J. Fisher. Anthropology
as Cultural Critigue: An Experimental Moment in the
Human Sciences. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1986.
Mead, Margaret. Coming of Age in Samoa. New York:
Morrow, 1960.
Miner, Horace. "Body Ritual Among the Nacirema."
American Anthropologist 58 (1956): 503-07.
Murdock, George P. Outline of Cultural Materialism. New
411
Haven, CT: HRAF, 1961.
Myerhoff, Barbara and Jay Ruby. Introduction. A Crack in
the Mirror: Reflexive Perspectives in Anthropology.
Ed. Jay Ruby. Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P,
1982. 1-35.
Neel, Jasper. Plato. Derrida. and Writing. Carbondale,
IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1988.
Nelson, John S. "Political Foundations for the Rhetoric
of Inquiry." The Rhetorical Turn: Invention and
Persuasion in the Conduct of Inquiry. Ed. Herbert
W. Simons. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1990. 268-81.
Overington, Michael A. "The Scientific Community as
Audience: Toward a Rhetorical Analysis of Science."
Philosophy and Rhetoric 10 (1977): 143-52.
Plato. Goroias. Trans. W. C. Helmbold. Indianapolis, IN:
Bobbs Merrill, 1952.
Phaedrus. Trans. W. C. Helmbold and W. G.
Rabinowitz. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs Merrill, 1956.
"Meno." The Collected Dialogues of Plato. Eds.
Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Trans.
W. K. C. Guthrie. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1969.
353-84.
"Phaedo." The Collected Dialogues of Plato. Trans.
Hugh Tredennick. Eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington
Cairns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1969. 40-98.
"Timaeus." The Collected Dialogues of Plato.
412
Trans. Benjamin Jowett. Eds. Edith Hamilton and
Huntington Cairns. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1969.
1151-1211.
Pyles, Thomas and John Algeo. The Origins and Development
of the English Language. 3rd ed. New York: Harcourt,
Brace, Jovanovich, 1982.
Rabinow, Paul. Symbolic Domination: Cultural Form and
Historical Change in Morroco. Chicago: U of Chicago
P, 1975.
Richards, I. A. The Philosophy of Rhetoric. New York:
Oxford UP, 1936.
Rorty, Richard. "Science as Solidarity.*' The Rhetoric
of the Human Sciences: Language and Argument in
Scholarship and Public Affairs. Eds. John Nelson,
Allan Megill, and Donald N. McCloskey. Madison: The
U of Wisconsin P, 1987. 34-51.
Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York: Pantheon Books,
1978.
The World, the Text. and the Critic. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard UP, 1983.
Sangren, Steven P. "Rhetoric and the Authority of
Ethnography." Current Anthropology 29.3 (1988): 405-
35.
Schneider, David M. American Kinship: A Cultural
Account. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1980.
Scott, Robert. "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic." Cen-
413
tral States Speech Journal 18 (1967): 17.
Spiro, Melford E. Oedipus in the Trobriands. Chicago:
U of Chicago P, 1982.
Tedlock, Dennis. “Anthropological Hermeneutics and the
Problem of Alphabetic Literacy." A Crack in the
Mirror: Reflexive Perspectives in Anthropology.
Ed. Jay Ruby. Philadelphia: The U of Pennsylvania
P, 1982. 149-161.
Trueblood, David. Philosophy of Religion. Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1957.
Turner, Victor. “Dramatic Ritual/Ritual Drama: Performa¬
tive and Reflexive Anthropology." A Crack in the
Mirror: Reflexive Perspectives in Anthropology.
Ed. Jay Ruby. Philadelphia: The U of Pennsylvania
P, 1982. 83-97.
Tyler, Stephen A. "The Poetic Turn in Postmodern
Anthropology: The Poetry of Paul Friedrich."
American Anthropologist. 6 (1984): 328-336.
"Post-Modern Ethnography: From Document of the
Occult to Occult Document." Writing Culture: The
Poetics and Politics of Ethnography. Eds. James
Clifford and George E. Marcus. Berkeley: U of Cali¬
fornia P, 1986. 122-140.
Van Maanen, John. Tales of the Field: On Writing
Ethnography. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1988.
Wallace, Anthony F. C. The Death and Rebirth of the
414
Seneca. New York: Vintage Books, 1972.
Webster, Grant. The Republic of Letters: A History of
Postwar American Literary Opinion. Baltimore, MD: The
Johns Hopkins UP, 1979.
Webster, Steven. "Dialogue and Fiction in Ethnography."
Dialectical Anthropology 7.2 (1982): 91-114.
"Ethnography as Storytelling." Dialectical
Anthropology. 8.1 (1983): 185-206.
"Realism and Reification in the Ethnographic Genre."
Critique of Anthropology. Spring 6.1 (1986): 39-62.
Yarbrough, Stephen R. "Differance, Deference, and the
Question of Proper Reading." Man and World 20 (1987):
266-285.
